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Attorney Liability for Tortious Interference:
Interference with Contractual Relations or
Interference with the Practice of Law?
ALEX B. LONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Attorney misconduct and litigation sometimes g o h a n d -in-hand.
Sometimes, an attorney is accused of misconduct during litigation,
sparking ethics charges or judicial sanctions. Other times, it is an
attorney’s litigation misconduct that spawns new litigation. In an age of
increased concern from members of the bar and the public at large about
declining standards of professionalism,1 it is hardly surprising that there
has been a perceived trend toward increasing attorney liability to third
parties.2
Of course, intentional tort claims against attorneys for conduct that
relates to the representation of a client are hardly a new phenomenon. 3
Typical claims include malicious prosecution or wrongful initiation of
civil proceedings,4 abuse of process,5 civil conspiracy,6 defamation,7 and

* Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
1. See William N. Clark, President’s Page, 65 ALA. LAW. 8, 8 (2004) (noting “the
dramatic change in the perception of the public regarding lawyers”); Van M. Pounds,
Promoting Truthfulness in Negotiations: A Mindful Approach, 401 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
181, 187 (2004) (noting the use of “‘Rambo-like’ tactics that, while often prized by the
client, are vilified by the remainder of society”); see also Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray,
730 N.E.2d 4, 9 (Ill. 2000) (involving tortious interference claim stemming from
defendant-attorneys’ reporting of misconduct of another attorney in the law firm,
allegedly with knowledge that allegations were false).
2. See Barbara Glesner Fines, Speculating on the Future of Attorney Responsibility to
Nonclients, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (1996); J. Randolph Evans & Ida Patterson
Dorvee, Attorney Liability for Assisting Clients with Wrongful Conduct: Established and
Emerging Bases of Liability, 45 S.C. L. REV. 803, 803-04 (1994); Paul T. Hayden,
Reconsidering the Litigator’s Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 986
(1993).
3. See Evans & Dorvee, supra note 2, at 803-04.
4. See, e.g., Ely v. Whitlock, 385 S.E.2d 893, 896 (Va. 1989) (barring claim of
malicious prosecution against attorney stemming from attorney’s filing of disciplinary
complaints against plaintiff-attorney).
5 . See, e.g., id. at 897 (barring claim of malicious prosecution against attorney
stemming from attorney’s filing of disciplinary complaints against plaintiff-attorney, but
permitting abuse of process claim to proceed).
6. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Copeland, 455 F. Supp. 749, 753 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d 595
F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1979) (barring claim of civil conspiracy against attorney stemming
from statements contained in a letter sent by attorney to judge).
7. See, e.g., id. at 751-52 (barring claim of defamation against attorney stemming from
statements contained in a letter sent by attorney to judge).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 What is perhaps new is the
increasing attention in bar ethics opinions9 and legal decisions10 being paid
to one type of tort claim in particular: tortious interference with
contractual relations. The fact that there have been several recent cases
involving tortious interference claims against attorneys for conduct or
statements occurring during the representation of a client that more
naturally might have sounded under a different tort theory, suggests that
plaintiffs may be becoming more creative in their attempts to circumvent
some of the bright-line rules that typically shield attorneys from liability in
such situations. 11 Occasionally, some of these attempts to bypass the
restrictions of other tort theories even prove successful.12

8. See, e.g., Kinamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(permitting plaintiff to maintain action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
based upon letter written to plaintiff by defendant-attorneys, which threatened criminal
sanctions as a means to collect debt allegedly owed by plaintiff), overruled by Silberg v.
Anderson, 786 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1990).
9. Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Informal Op. No. 2004-1 (2004); Fla. Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 02-5 (2003); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-414 (1999); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and
Prof’l Responsibility, Op. No. 99-100 (1999).
10. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004); In re
Berry Pub. Servs., Inc., 231 B.R. 676 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999); Ingalsbe v. Stewart
Agency, Inc., 869 So. 2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Horowitz v. Holabird & Root,
816 N.E.2d 227 (Ill. 2004); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Rusell, P.A.,
742 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
11. See Mantia v. Hanson, 79 P.3d 404 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (involving interference
claim stemming from law firm’s filing of an allegedly baseless claim); Safeway Ins. Co.
v. Guerrerro, 83 P.3d 560 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (involving interference claim stemming
from alleged scheme to manufacture a bad faith claim against plaintiff that was not
permitted by state law); McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP v. Keller, No. A-4A0624,
2004 WL 859178 (Ga. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2004) (involving allegation that defendantattorney tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s prospective employment relationship by
sending allegedly defamatory letter to prospective employer); Salit, 742 So. 2d at 385-88
(holding that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for tortious interference against law
firm that helped client take over corporation, but holding that plaintiff had omitted one
element of injurious falsehood claim); see also Berry Pub. Servs., Inc., 231 B.R. at 683
(dismissing tortious interference claim against client stemming from attorney’s alleged
tortious interference, but permitting tortious interference claim against attorney to
proceed); Horowitz, 816 N.E.2d a t 284 (dismissing claim attempting to hold client
vicariously liable for attorney’s tortious interference); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 819 S.W.2d
406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (involving tortious interference claim stemming from allegedly
defamatory statements made by attorney to government agency during representation of
client); Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App. 1988) (involving tortious
claim stemming from attorney’s persuasion of plaintiff’s attorney to limit crossexamination of witness).
12. Safeway Ins. Co., Inc., 83 P.3d at 567 (denying summary judgment for attorney);
infra notes 87-143 and accompanying text (discussing this situation); Salit, 742 So. 2d at
386 (denying law firm’s motion to dismiss); Kennedy, 819 S.W.2d at 409 (denying
attorney’s motion to dismiss). Compare Jackson, 372 F.3d a t 1275 (holding that
Florida’s absolute litigation privilege barred plaintiff’s tortious interference claim against
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As is the case with other tort actions, courts face a difficult choice in
deciding whether to permit an aggrieved litigation opponent or attorney to
bring a tortious interference claim against an opposing attorney. These
situations force courts to choose between furthering the tort law goals of
deterrence of undesirable conduct and compensation of injury and
preserving the ability of attorneys to act fearlessly as advocates on behalf
of their clients. For example, while it is clearly unethical for an attorney
to bring a frivolous claim on behalf of a client for the purpose of
interfering with the defendant’s relationships with others, should such an
action amount to tortious interference? What if the attorney is accused of
misrepresenting his client’s intent to settle with an insurer, all in an
attempt to drive a wedge between the insurer and its insured? Or if the
attorney abuses the conflict of interest rules in order to force the
withdrawal of opposing counsel, thereby depriving a client of his or her
chosen counsel? Or if the attorney convinces a co-defendant’s attorney to
engage in questionable trial tactics, all in an attempt to keep secret the first
attorney’s disqualifying conflicts of interest?
While any tort claim in such scenarios might present a court with a
difficult policy choice, tortious interference claims present some
particularly vexing problems. Interference claims have generated a
significant amount of scholarship, much of it critical. 13 To some critics,
the basic test for determining the propriety of a defendant’s successful
attempt to induce another party to terminate a contractual or business
relationship is so ill-defined as to be almost unworkable. 14 Others have
attacked the torts on efficiency grounds, charging that, by making an
outside party’s successful attempt to induce another party to terminate its
relationship with another i n t o a t o r t , the torts discourage efficient
breaches.15 Still others have noted the potential for the torts to undermine
other established bodies of law. 16 In the case of interference claims
involving attorney conduct related to the representation of a client, the
attorneys), with Ingalsbe, 869 So. 2d at 33 (holding that Florida’s absolute litigation
privilege did not bar plaintiff’s tortious interference claim against attorney).
13. See Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the Doctrine
of Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the Notion of the Contract Breacher as Wrongdoer, 47
BUFFALO L. REV. 645, 710 (1999); Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It is
Engulfing Commercial Law, Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175 (1996); Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and
Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1099
(1993); Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic
Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Principles, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 61
(1982); Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L.
REV. 335, 343 (1980).
14. See Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 957 P.2d 1076, 1085 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998).
15. See Perlman, supra note 13, at 89-90.
16 . See Alex Long, The Disconnect Between At-Will Employment and Tortious
Interference with Business Relations: Rethinking Tortious Interference Claims in the
Employment Context, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491 (2001); Gergen, supra note 13, at 1219.

4

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL E THICS

[VOL. 18:0000

interference torts pose an additional concern: a risk that they may chill
legitimate advocacy on behalf of clients.
This Article focuses on attorney liability for tortious interference for
conduct relating to the representation of a client and the potential for such
claims to interfere with the ability of attorneys to practice law.
Specifically, it deals with tortious interference claims against attorneys
involving conduct occurring during the representation of a client and that
lies close to the core of what it means to practice law. Such cases must be
distinguished from interference cases involving attorney conduct that more
closely resembles the business of law, rather than the practice of law. This
latter category of cases often involves one attorney’s solicitation of law
firm clients after or before the attorney has departed a law firm;17 one cocounsel’s alleged interference with her co-counsel’s relationship with a
shared client; 18 a rival attorney’s solicitation of the client of another
attorney; 19 or a rival attorney’s attempt to sabotage a competitor’s
relationship with a client out of simple spite or ill will. 20 These types of
cases present their own set of problems and, in these cases, the actions of
the defendant-attorney are somewhat removed from what can be classified
as the pure practice of law. Nor does the Article discuss situations in
which an attorney is charged with tortious interference after having
advised a client to breach or not enter into a contract; courts have made it
clear that an attorney has a conditional privilege to take such action, as
long as the attorney is acting in good faith. 21 Finally (although the cases
are legion), this Article does not address situations in which a non-lawyer
is accused of tortiously interfering with an attorney-client relationship.22
17. See Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Ethics of Grabbing
and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1988); Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm
Clients by Departing Partners and Associates: Tort Fiduciary and Disciplinary Liability,
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1988); Mark W. Bennett, You Can’t Take It with You: The Ethics
of Lawyer Departure and Solicitation of Firm Clients, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 395
(1997).
18. See, e.g., Krebbs v. Mull, 727 So. 2d 564, 565-66 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
19. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Chambers, 577 So. 2d 1125, 1127-28 (La. Ct. App. 1991),
rev’d, 584 So. 2d 665 (La. 1991).
20. See Winiemko v. Valenti, 513 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Mich. App. Ct. 1994) (involving
defendant-law firm that sent an improper lien letter to plaintiff-attorney’s major client
following a dispute between plaintiff and defendant, for whom plaintiff had formerly
worked).
21. See, e.g., Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that attorney was privileged to advise client to breach contract, even though his
motivation may have been to enhance his position with his corporation, where his
conduct was motivated in part by desire to benefit the corporation).
22. For an annotation of such cases, see Phoebe Carter, Annotation, Liability in Tort
for Interference with Attorney-Client Relationship, 90 A.L.R.4th 621 (1991). The
defendants in such cases, their forms of allegedly improper interference, and the
decisions come in all shapes and sizes. Some of the more interesting cases involve
adverse parties who seek to settle with a represented party behind the back of the party’s
attorney, see Ingalsbe v. Stewart Agency, Inc., 869 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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Instead, the Article focuses only on those situations involving attorney
conduct that can arguably be categorized as the practice of law. The
Article argues that the primary concern with interference claims in this
context is the potential for such claims to chill legitimate advocacy.
However, it argues that interference claims, and tort law more generally,
can serve an important role in maintaining professionalism among
attorneys and preserving other important societal values. In an attempt to
balance these competing concerns, the Article suggests that courts move
toward a more context-specific approach in formulating rules for
determining when an attorney has interfered improperly with the
relationship of another.
Part II provides background concerning the interference torts and the
criticisms that they have engendered. Part III discusses some of the
special problems that interference claims may present when they are
brought against attorneys for conduct relating to the representation of a
2004) (holding that plaintiff-attorney stated claim); Goldberg v. Whitehead, 713 A.2d
204, 205 (R.I. 1998) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff-attorney’s claim), and non-lawyer
advisers who suggest to a represented client that an attorney be fired. See Calbom v.
Knudtzon, 396 P.2d 148, 150 (Wash. 1964). One of the more common types of
defendant is an insurance company. In numerous cases, attorneys have charged insurance
companies with tortious interference after the companies settled directly with their
clients. Cross v. Am. Country Ins. Co., 875 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1989); Edwards v.
Travelers Ins. of Hartford, Conn., 563 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1977); Volz v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., Inc., 498 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1974); Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd. v.
Freeman, 229 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1955); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447
(4th Cir. 1950); Liston v. Home Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Brunswick
v. Safeco Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 1202 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Ronald M. Sharrow, Chartered
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 492 (Md. 1986); Ross v. Woyan, 439 N.E.2d 428
(Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Knell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 336 N.E.2d 568, 569 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 489 P.2d 837 (Ariz.
1971); Fowler v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 124 S.E.2d 520 (N.C. 1962); Herron v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 363 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1961); Keels v. Powell, 34 S.E.2d 482 (S.C. 1945);
Lurie v. New Amsterdam Cas. Corp., 1 N.E.2d 472 (N.Y. 1936). In some of these cases,
the insurance companies allegedly caused, see, e.g., Herron, 363 P.2d at 311, or in some
cases required, see, e.g., Ronald M. Sharrow, Chartered, 511 A.2d at 494, a client to
discharge an attorney before settlement. In others, the companies simply settled directly
with the client, thereby depriving the attorney of the expected value of the attorney’s
contingency fee, see Liston, 659 F. Supp. at 280-82, or settled directly without making
any effort to insure that the attorney’s fee was paid. See Cross, 875 F.2d at 627
(involving unfulfilled promise by insurer to client that insurer would pay attorney’s fee);
Knell, 336 N.E.2d at 569-70 (involving insurer’s settlement with client, despite the
existence of an attorney’s lien, and failure to protect the attorney’s interest in the lien).
The courts are split in their handling of such cases, with some basing liability on the mere
act of intentional interference, despite the absence of any improper means such as fraud,
see, e.g., Liston, 659 F. Supp. at 281, and others holding that the insurer must have
engaged in some improper conduct apart from the mere act of interference. See, e.g.,
Volz, 498 F.2d at 663. This same question as to whether a mere act of intentional
interference should be sufficient to support a finding of liability or whether a defendant
must engage in some other type of improper conduct plagues interference case law in
general. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
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client. Part IV suggests several adjustments to the basic elements of an
interference claim when such claims are asserted against attorneys for
conduct relating to the representation of a client. Finally, Part V discusses
several cases involving such claims in order to illustrate these problems
and how the proposed adjustments would further the societal interests in
preserving contractual relationships (and particularly those of attorneys
and their clients) and insuring an ethical legal profession. Specifically, it
focuses on cases involving interference claims stemming from the filing of
a lawsuit,23 pre-trial settlement strategy,24 the use of the rules regarding
conflicts of interest to disqualify opposing counsel, 25 and trial tactics.26
II. THE PROBLEM(S) WITH TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE RELATIONS
As described by the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement”), a
prima facie case of tortious interference with contract exists where a
defendant intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of
a contract between two parties by inducing or otherwise causing one party
not to perform the contract. 27 The elements of a claim of tortious
interference with prospective contractual relations are essentially the
same, the difference being that a defendant is liable where the defendant
induces or causes a third person not to enter into or continue a prospective
relation or prevents the plaintiff from acquiring or continuing the
prospective relation.28 Despite the seeming similarity and simplicity of
the torts, the interference torts have proven particularly difficult to deal
with in practice.
To put some of the problems with interference claims in the legal
setting in some perspective, consider the following situation: an attorney
certifies his client’s intent to call as a witness one of the attorneys from the
law firm representing the opposing party. 29 Based on this conflict, the
attorney moves to disqualify the other attorney’s law firm from
representing the opposing party. As it turns out, the attorney never had
any intention of calling the other attorney as a witness and used the
23. Mantia v. Hanson, 79 P.3d 404, 406 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); infra notes 219-233 and
accompanying text.
24. Safeway Ins. Co. v. Guerrerro, 83 P.3d 560 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); infra notes 23470 and accompanying text.
25. Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1994); Drummond v. Stahl, 618 P.2d 616 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1980); infra notes 273-293 and accompanying text.
26. Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App. 1988); infra notes 294-309 and
accompanying text.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
28. Id. § 766B.
29. This “hypothetical” case is based on Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes
& Mitchell, P.A. v. United Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994), and is discussed in
greater detail infra Part V.C.
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disqualification rules as a tactical device to remove the other attorney
(who, as it turns out, had won thirty out of the last thirty-one cases he had
tried in such matters)30 and his firm. The other lawyer and his client are,
understandably, upset. It seems unlikely that a malicious prosecution or
abuse of process claim would be available to the plaintiffs, so a tortious
interference claim would be the logical alternative.31 But would such a
claim provide a remedy in this instance? Is the mere fact that the
defendant-attorney intended to bring about the end of the attorney-client
relationship sufficient to impose liability or must the defendant’s conduct
have been improper beyond the mere fact of intentional interference?
Does the fact that the client could have terminated the attorney-client
relationship at any time and for any reason limit the aggrieved law firm’s
ability to recover damages? Should an interference claim be allowed to
substitute for other causes of action that specifically address the type of
conduct at issue but would not allow recovery? Even if the plaintiffs
could clear these obstacles, would requiring the defendant to answer for
his conduct chill legitimate advocacy by other attorneys in future cases?
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

One problem has been the difficulty in determining which party bears
the burden of proof on what is usually the essential issue—the propriety of
the interference. The difficulty emerges in part from the question of
whether the interference torts are torts designed to protect property
interests or whether they are more relational in nature. 32 As the law
originally developed, courts essentially took a property-rights view of the
plaintiff’s interest in a contract or prospective relation.33 Thus, it was the
act of intentional interference that formed the basis of liability.34 In order
to avoid liability, the defendant was forced to assert the defense of
justification or privilege.35
The primary criticism of this approach is that it places too slight a
burden on a plaintiff with regard to the ultimate question of the overall
wrongfulness of the interference. 36 As with other intentional torts, a
plaintiff need not establish that the defendant actually desired to interfere
30. Gail Diane Cox, Lawyers Still Wage Uncivil War: Civility Codes Are in Vogue,
but Insults, Threats, Lies and Hardball Haven’t Stopped, NAT’L. L.J. at A1 (July 17,
1995).
31. See infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
32. See Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and
Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1100 (2000).
33. See Remington, supra note 13, at 663; Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with
Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 350-56 (1980); see Klauder v. Cregar,
192 A. 667, 668 (Pa. 1937) (stating that the existence of a contract “imposes on all the
world the duty of respecting that contractual obligation”).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. b.
35. See, e.g., Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 103 (Va. 1985).
36. See, e.g., Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 303 (Utah 1982).
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in order to satisfy the intent element; it is enough that the defendant knew
that interference was certain or substantially certain to result.37 This focus
on the defendant’s mental state, rather than the means used to accomplish
the interference, makes for a somewhat open-ended theory of liability.
The concerns regarding intent are particularly pronounced in the
commercial setting where one party’s termination of a contract may have
ripple effects on the relationships of others. 38 Thus, a defendant who
convinces A to sell goods to defendant, rather than B, might be forced to
justify the effect that such action had on B’s ability to satisfy its
contractual obligations to C, D, E, and F.39
In time, more courts began to move away from the view that mere
intentional interference constituted a prima facie case and began imposing
a requirement upon plaintiffs to establish that an interference was not only
intentional but “improper.”40 Thus, under this approach, “the concepts of
justification or privilege are ordinarily subsumed in the plaintiff’s [burden
of] proof.”41
B. THE FAILURE TO DECOUPLE THE INTERFERENCE TORTS

The question of which party bears the burden of establishing the
propriety or impropriety of an interference takes on greater significance in
the case of an interference with prospective relations. In such cases, the
plaintiff has not yet acquired a contractual relation.42 Given the fact that a
plaintiff in such a case has a lesser expectation and weaker security
interest, it stands to reason that such relations should ordinarily receive
less protection from outside interferences than existing contracts. 43
However, courts frequently fail to draw any distinction between the torts.44
Thus, in jurisdictions that require a defendant to justify an intentional
interference, a defendant is placed in the position of justifying an
interference with a right that a plaintiff only hopes one day to attain.45
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §766 cmt. j.
38. See Perlman, supra note 13, at 72.
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. h. The Restatement approach
would seek to limit the defendant’s possible liability in such cases by making the
defendant’s motive for interfering a relevant factor in the determination of the propriety
of the defendant’s actions, as well as taking into account “the proximity or remoteness of
the actor's conduct to the interference.” Id. § 767(f) cmt. h.
40. This is the approach adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. § 766.
41. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 726-27 (Tex. 2001).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. a.
43. Id. § 767 cmt. e.
44. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52 S.W.3d at 721 (noting the importance of
“decoupling” the interference torts and Texas’ failure to do so); Four Nines Gold, Inc. v.
71 Constr. Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 245 (Wyo. 1991) (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting) (referring to
justification, privilege, and “not improper” as “all being the same concept”).
45. See generally William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractarians, Community, and the Tort
of Interference with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1138 (1996) (summarizing the
criticism of others).
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In recent years, this seeming disparity in the relative rights and
obligations of the parties has led some courts to decouple the interference
torts.46 With claims of interference with existing contracts, the defendant
retains the burden of asserting a justification or privilege for the
interference. Where, however, the plaintiff’s interest is in a prospective
relation, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant’s
conduct was somehow improper or wrongful apart from the mere act of
intentional interference itself.47 Therefore, in such jurisdictions, the
defendant’s mental state becomes significantly less important than the
defendant’s actual conduct. Typically, in such jurisdictions, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant’s conduct was “independently tortious” or
that the defendant employed wrongful methods to accomplish the
interference.48
C. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF CONTRACTS TERMINABLE AT WILL

While a handful of jurisdictions have decoupled the interference torts
and placed a greater burden upon a plaintiff attempting to prove tortious
interference with a prospective contractual relation, most have failed to
address the question of how to treat interferences with contracts
terminable at will. While such relationships are certainly contractual, a
plaintiff has far less security in these agreements than in other contracts.
In terms of a plaintiff’s expectation of return performance, such contracts
closely resemble prospective contractual relations.49 Indeed, in the case of
competition as a form of interference, the Restatement specifically treats
prospective contractual relations and contracts terminable at will in the
same fashion: a defendant who interferes with either does not improperly
interfere provided, inter alia, the defendant does not employ improper
means.50 The similarity between the two types of relations has led a few
courts to either suggest that defendants have greater latitude to interfere
with such contracts,51 or more formally hold that interferences with such
contracts should be analyzed under the same standard as interferences with
prospective contractual relations.52

46. See cases cited infra note 47.
47. See Trade ‘N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Arms, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 707, 719
(N.D. 2001); Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 954 (Cal. 2003);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52 S.W.3d at 726; Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000); McGeechan v. Sherwood, 760 A.2d 1068, 1081 (Me. 2000); Maximus,
Inc. v. Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Sys. Co., 493 S.E.2d 375, 378 (Va. 1997); Duggin v.
Adams, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (Va. 1987).
48. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52 S.W.3d at 726; Maximus, Inc., 493 S.E.2d at 378-79.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. c.
50. Id. § 768.
51. Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980).
52. Reeves v. Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513, 520 (Cal. 2004); Maximus, Inc., 493 S.E.2d at 378.
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By and large, however, courts have failed to draw any distinction
between contracts terminable at will and more traditional contracts. 53
Aside from the rule regarding competition, contracts terminable at will are
treated like other types of contracts. 54 As is the case with interferences
with prospective relations, this failure to distinguish between the different
interests involved has led some to question what “right” a defendant has
interfered with if a plaintiff has no right to return performance to begin
with.55
D. THE CONFUSING CONCEPT OF “IMPROPER” INTERFERENCE

In terms of the actual elements of the torts, the most consistent
criticism has been with the requirement that a defendant must have
“improperly” interfered before liability can attach. 56 The Restatement
suggests that the question of whether a defendant improperly interfered
with another’s relationship can be resolved by balancing seven factors,
including the nature of the defendant’s conduct, the defendant’s motive,
and the interests of the plaintiff.57 Like any balancing test, however, it is
53. See, e.g., Hall v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 454 So. 2d 1338, 1344 (Ala. 1984).
54. For example, aside from the section regarding competition as a form of proper or
improper interference, none of the other sections in the Restatement draw any distinction
between contracts terminable at will and other contracts, despite the fact that they draw
distinctions between existing contracts and prospective contractual relations. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 768-73.
55. See Woodward, supra note 45, at 1113 (“If there is no right against the promisor
for breach of contract, how can there be a right against a third party for interfering with
‘it’?”). This has been one of the primary attacks by those who argue that interference
claims may discourage efficient breaches. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Tortious
Interference with Contract Versus Efficient Breach of Contract: Theory and Empirical
Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL. STUD. 131, 136 (1999). By imposing liability upon a party who
encourages another to take action that amounts to an efficient breach, critics charge,
tortious interference with contract claims result in inefficiency and have the potential to
discourage competition. See Myers, supra note 13, at 1132-34. This is particularly true
in the case of prospective contractual relations and contracts terminable at will where, by
definition, there is no breach.
56. See, e.g., Amy Timmer, Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations: A
Tort Only a Mind Reader Could Plead in the Michigan Courts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1443,
1445 (1999).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767. The full list of factors is as follows:
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difficult to predict from one situation to the next whether a defendant has
interfered improperly. Aside from such virtually unanswerable questions
as how much weight one should give to, for example, “the societal
interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other” as opposed to “the proximity or
remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference,”58 questions as to a
defendant’s mental state continue to plague interference case law. The
fact that the Restatement indicates that an interference must be both
intentional and improper to be actionable would seem to indicate that a
plaintiff must establish that an interference is wrongful by reason other
than the mere fact of intentional interference. However, the comments to
the Restatement suggest that the fact that a defendant actually desired to
interfere may be important enough to trump all of the remaining factors,
particularly if the defendant was motivated by ill will.59 Not surprisingly,
in light of these kinds of concerns, at least one court has concluded that
the Restatement’s approach is essentially unworkable in practice.60
In an effort to reduce the confusion, some courts have condensed the
Restatement’s seven-factor approach into the rule that a defendant
interferes improperly where the defendant acts with an improper purpose
or employs improper means. 61 While some courts continue to make
reference to “malice” rendering an interference improper, malice in the
sense of spite or ill will is not necessarily required.62 The focus on the
defendant’s mental state, however, has triggered other criticisms. Some
courts have rejected the idea that an improper purpose can render an
interference improper as being inconsistent with the idea that a wrongful
motive does not, by itself, make a lawful action tortious.63 Others have
charged that a defendant’s purpose should rarely, if ever, be a legitimate
consideration because motive is an imperfect predictor of socially
undesirable results.64
E. THE POTENTIAL TO UNDERMINE OTHER BODIES OF LAW

Within the narrow scope of this Article, the greatest concern with
interference claims is their potential to undermine other bodies of law.
Some courts consider tortious interference claims as essentially serving as
gap-fillers for other types of defective claims. 65 For example, in

12

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL E THICS

[VOL. 18:0000

jurisdictions that have decoupled the interference torts and require a
plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s actions were “independently
tortious,” some have defined the phrase “independently tortious” in such a
manner that the defendant’s actions need not amount to a separate tort.
Instead, the conduct must only violate some other recognized tort duty.66
For example, the Texas Supreme Court has explained that “a plaintiff may
recover for tortious interference from a defendant who makes fraudulent
statements about the plaintiff to a third person without proving that the
third person was actually defrauded,” provided that the defendant acted
with the intent to deceive. 67 Thus, the court explained, “an action for
interference with a prospective contractual or business relation provides a
remedy for injurious conduct that other tort actions might not reach . . . but
only for conduct that is already recognized to be wrongful under the
common law or by statute.”68
While the Texas Supreme Court has at least attempted to establish
some contours to the concept of independently tortious or wrongful
means, other courts view the concept in a more elastic fashion. Violations
of the standards of an established trade or profession might constitute
improper methods, as might such amorphous actions as engaging in “sharp
dealing” or “overreaching.”69 This willingness to allow certain actions to
form the basis of an interference claim that might not be actionable under
a different tort theory has meant that plaintiffs often bring such claims in
addition to or in place of other, more obviously applicable claims based on
the same general conduct. 70 Thus, for example, truth may be an absolute
defense to a defamation claim, but not to a claim of tortious interference.71
The danger in such cases is that interference claims may undermine the
policy choices previously made with respect to other bodies of law that

66. Id. at 713.
67. Id. at 726.
68. Id. at 713.
69. Duggin v. Adams, 360 S.E.2d 832, 837 (Va. 1987); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c.
Violation of recognized ethical codes for a particular area of business
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have developed, in large measure, to regulate the behavior of the
defendant that is now the basis of an interference claim.72
F. IN DEFENSE OF THE INTERFERENCE TORTS

While acknowledging some of the concerns raised by critics, defenders
of the interference torts posit that the torts nonetheless may serve an
important purpose. These defenders argue that the criticisms suffer from
an unnecessarily cramped view of the proper role of contract law. For
instance, although the defenders of the interference torts admit that the
standards for determining whether an interference is improper may be
vague, they argue that the standards are no more vague than other
concepts in the commercial setting, such as the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing.73
Defenders typically take a relational view of the torts. 74 Under this
conception of the torts, there is a societal benefit to relational stability that
the torts seek to advance. 75 While noting some of the contract-based
criticisms of the torts, defenders contend that the interference torts
rightfully protect interests beyond those that are protected under contract
law.76 One of the justifications that has been advanced for tort regulation
of contractual relationships is the need to control the potential adverse
effects on third parties that may flow from the behavior of the contracting
parties.77 At the same time, tort law has long been concerned with
deterring socially undesirable conduct and reflecting community values.78
In recognizing certain tort claims, courts, rightly or wrongly, occasionally
take the pulse of the public and craft legal rules that hopefully advance the

72. Long, supra note 16, at 529-30; Gergen, supra note 13, at 1220-21; Myers, supra
note 13, at 1137-39.
73. See Woodward, supra note 45, at 1129-33; Marina Lao, Tortious Interference and
the Federal Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 83 IOWA L. REV. 35, 56 (1997).
74. See Woodward, supra note 45, at 1176 (“Viewing the tort as a mechanism to
protect relationships rather than the promisee's expectation interests also frees analysis
for direct consideration of the appropriate scope for the tort.”).
75. See id. at 1171.
76. See id. at 1174.
77. Stewart L. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party
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public’s sense of morality or justice. 79 By focusing so heavily on the
expectation interests of the contracting parties, defenders of the
interference torts argue that critics tend to overvalue contract law and
ignore the potential for interference claims to redress injuries to broader
societal values inherent in certain contractual settings. 80 These interests
may include the interests of third parties who are affected by the
termination of an agreement or broader community values that are
implicated whenever a relationship is ended prematurely or is prevented
from coming into fruition. 81 In this respect, the fact that a defendant’s
intentional interference might not amount to an independent tort does not
necessarily make the defendant’s conduct any less improper.82
Indeed, the inherent need to look to societal value judgments is
perhaps stronger in the case of the interference torts than in the case of
other torts. In some respects, the interference torts more closely resemble
the employment law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy, where the defendant’s actions must offend some substantial public
policy to support liability,83 than they resemble other traditional torts. In
the wrongful discharge context, it is at least as much the harm to society
that justifies the imposition of liability against a defendant as it is the harm
to a particular plaintiff. 84 The law regarding tortious interference claims
involves similar considerations. Aside from the Restatement’s admonition
that “the societal interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor
and the contractual interests of the other” 85 must be considered in
assessing the propriety of an interference, the case law contains numerous
references to the need to inquire whether the defendant’s conduct is “both
injurious and transgressive of generally accepted standards of common
morality or of law.”86 Thus, both the interference and wrongful discharge
torts require a resort to some expression of public values in order to
determine the wrongfulness of a defendant’s conduct, and both look
beyond the harm to the plaintiff and to the more generalized harm to the
public as a result of a defendant’s actions as the underlying justification
79. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 418 (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[A] willful
and malicious termination of employment is so offensive to community values that it may
give rise to tort remedies.”).
80. See Woodward, supra note 45, at 1128; Lao, supra note 73, at 60; see also
Woodward, supra note 45, at 1133 (stating that most of tort law imposes “a limitation on
individual freedom engendered by the community strain in our culture.”).
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for their existence. While wrongful discharge case law has hardly been
without controversy, over time there has emerged a general understanding
among employers as to what types of actions may ultimately subject them
to liability.87 There is no reason to believe that a similar result could not
occur with the interference torts.
III. THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS POSED BY INTERFERENCE CLAIMS IN THE
LEGAL SETTING (AND SOME POSSIBLE BENEFITS)
Tortious interference claims against attorneys that arise from actions
taken during the representation of a client may stem from many sources.
Such claims may involve an attorney advising a represented client
concerning the other lawyer’s handling of the client’s representation;88 an
attorney’s decision to file ethical charges against opposing counsel;89 an
attorney’s negative statements about opposing counsel to the trial judge; 90
an attorney’s public accusation that the opposing party has filed a baseless
lawsuit against the attorney’s client in an effort to extort money; 91 an
attorney’s misuse of the discovery process as a litigation tactic; 92 an
attorney’s failure to pursue a settlement offer; 93 an attorney’s improper
87. Generally speaking, there are four widely (although not universally) recognized
categories of wrongful discharge claims: (1) where an employee is fired for exercising
some statutory or constitutional right, see, e.g., Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297
N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (filing workers’ compensation claim); (2) where an employee is
fired for refusing to commit an unlawful act, see, e.g., Petermann v. Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959 (refusing to commit perjury); (3) where an
employee is fired for reporting unlawful conduct (i.e., whistleblowing), see, e.g.,
Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981); and (4) where an employee
is fired for performing some civic duty, see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P. 2d 512, 516 (Or.
1975) (serving on a jury).
88. Gilbert v. Jones, 370 S.E.2d 155, 155-56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
89. Drummond v. Stahl, 618 P.2d 616, 618 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
90. McLaughlin v. Copeland, 455 F. Supp. 749, 750-51 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d 595 F.2d
1213 (3d Cir. 1979).
91. Rothman v. Jackson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
92. Horowitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ill. 2004).
93. See Lettieri v. Perkins, No. 05-96-01609-CV, 1998 WL 430308 (Tex. App. July 31,
1998). It is unclear from the opinion exactly what the basis of the interference claim was.
From the facts presented, it appears that the clients alleged that their attorney committed
malpractice, in part, by failing to advise the clients of a settlement offer and to pursue the
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handling of a settlement offer; 94 an attorney’s insistence upon special
conditions in plea bargaining;95 an attorney’s tactical decision concerning
the examination of a witness; 96 and possibly even the decision to file
suit.97 Although it is possible that an attorney’s own client may assert
such a claim,98 more common is the situation in which an attorney faces
the potential for liability to an opposing party or counsel for conduct
relating to the representation of the attorney’s client.
Tort claims founded upon attorney misconduct during the
representation of a client pose special policy concerns for courts in
general, most notably the concern that they may chill legitimate advocacy.
However, the unusual nature of the interference torts presents perhaps
even greater problems than most traditional torts in this setting. At the
same time, the interference torts, and tort law more generally, may
advance important societal interests in this context if their contours are
properly defined.
A. THE OVERALL PROBLEM OF TORTS IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT

Courts have been cautious about permitting adverse parties and their
attorneys to sue opposing counsel based upon conduct occurring during
the litigation process. As a general rule, attorneys do not owe a duty to
exercise care for the benefit of opposing parties or counsel.99 Courts differ
with respect to what exceptions to this general principle they will
recognize. While most courts prohibit an adverse party from bringing a
negligence action against an attorney based upon the attorney’s
performance of legal work, 100 they are likely to recognize an exception
where the attorney’s conduct is malicious, fraudulent, or tortious.101 Some
states take a strict approach and will only recognize a claim based upon
fraudulent conduct on the part of an attorney; in these states, all other tort
actions are barred, regardless of whether they are brought by an adverse
party or opposing counsel.102 Other courts permit actions only for certain
torts, such as civil conspiracy 103 or wrongful initiation of civil
the opposing party. Thus, the logical claim would have been tortious interference with
contract. See id. at *3 (noting the clients’ claim of tortious interference with contract).
94. Safeway Ins. Co. v. Guerrero, 83 P.2d 560 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
95. Clark v. Brown, 393 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1990).
96. Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App. 1988).
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proceedings;104 all other tort actions stemming from actions or statements
made in the course of judicial proceedings, such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress, are barred.105 At least one jurisdiction takes a more
absolute approach and extends an absolute immunity to any act occurring
during the course of a judicial proceeding, regardless of the nature of the
conduct.106
In the case of intentional torts, several policy justifications have been
offered in support of the general climate of limited liability for conduct
stemming from the litigation process. Most of these justifications are
derived from the policy justifications underlying the absolute privilege to
publish defamatory materials concerning another during the course of and
as part of the proceeding as long as the matter has some relation to the
proceeding.107 As is the case with any recognized privilege, the privilege
to defame in the course of judicial proceedings is based upon the
conclusion that the harm to individual plaintiffs in permitting parties and
their attorneys to publish defamatory statements is outweighed by the
harm that would result if such individuals were not free to speak freely.108
In the case of parties to judicial proceedings, the existence of an
absolute privilege is based in large measure “upon the public interest in
according to all men the utmost freedom of access to the courts of justice
for the settlement of their private disputes.”109 Aside from preserving the
ability of parties to speak freely in support of their causes, the absolute
privilege is said to preserve freedom of access to the courts by insuring
that parties are not deprived of the benefit of legal representation by the
specter of tort liability against their attorneys. 110 Permitting lawsuits
based upon an attorney’s conduct during the litigation process raises the
dangers of increased time and cost to the client, the injection of an
adversarial element into the attorney-client relationship, and the possible
termination of the attorney-client relationship.111 The specter of tort
liability against an attorney may threaten the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship, thus depriving a client of chosen counsel and undermining
the public interest in the administration of justice.112 In order to protect

104. Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 371 (Cal. 1990); Lewis v. Swenson, 617 P.2d
69, 72 (Ariz. 1980).
105. Franson v. Radich, 735 P.2d 632, 635 (1987).
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this relationship, attorneys, like their clients, also enjoy an absolute
privilege to publish defamatory materials.113
Another closely related justification for the existence of the absolute
privilege is the need to secure for attorneys “the utmost freedom in their
efforts to secure justice for their clients.” 114 If, the argument goes,
attorneys could be subject to defamation suits for statements made during
the litigation process, they would be less inclined to vigorously assert their
clients’ rights. 115 Thus, the absolute privilege works to insure that
attorneys are able to fulfill their ethical duty of zealous representation.116
At common law, the absolute litigator’s privilege existed with respect
to defamatory statements. As the same rationale that applies in the
defamation context may apply with equal force to other tort actions, the
privilege has been extended over time to cover a variety of intentional tort
actions stemming from litigation conduct. 117 However, as evidenced by
the varying approaches in different jurisdictions, one of the difficulties
courts have faced is in deciding to which causes of action the absolute
privilege should apply. 118 For example, i n probably a majority of
jurisdictions, attorneys do not enjoy an absolute privilege with respect to
the torts of malicious prosecution and wrongful initiation of civil
proceedings, despite the fact that they are expected to be zealous
advocates on behalf of their clients.119
Courts have experienced other problems in attempting to define the
contours of attorney liability. For instance, when one moves beyond the
traditional courtroom setting and into quasi-judicial settings, such as the
lawyer disciplinary process, courts have split on the question of how to
balance the competing policy interests at issue. Society certainly wishes
to encourage a resort to the disciplinary process in order to further the
proper administration of justice and maintain public confidence in the
legal profession; however, there are the countervailing concerns that it is
simply unfair to deny attorneys remedies afforded to other individuals and
t h a t providing attorneys with immunity from tort liability would
encourage the use of disciplinary charges as a weapon.120 The result has
been a split among courts and legislatures on the question of whether a
non-lawyer is immune from liability in tort based upon the filing of an
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ethics complaint.121 Similarly, courts and bar associations have struggled
with the question of whether complaints made to formal disciplinary
agencies or local bar associations can form the basis of tort liability or
professional discipline.122
B. SPECIAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INTERFERENCE TORTS

As if the interference torts were not already problematic enough, their
entry into the legal setting brings with it a special set of concerns. One
problem is the potential for the interference torts to overwhelm other
recognized causes of action and, in the process, undermine the policy
choices previously made with respect to those causes of action. This
concern is particularly pronounced in the legal setting given the important
policy values implicated by the practice of law.
Interference claims are, theoretically, a particularly useful tort for
plaintiffs because the standard for improper interference is so amorphous.
For example, a plaintiff bears a particularly heavy burden with respect to
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in establishing that
the defendant-attorney’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. The
litigation process is not for the faint of heart; some conduct that might be
considered extreme and outrageous in other settings is par for the course
during litigation. 123 This is true even where the defendant-attorney’s
conduct might violate the rules of professional responsibility. 124 In
contrast, to prevail on a claim of tortious interference against an attorney,
a plaintiff simply needs to establish that the defendant’s conduct was
“improper.” A plaintiff is theoretically helped by the fact that a violation
of an ethical code may amount to the use of improper methods sufficient
to render the interference improper.125
121. See Drummond v. Stahl, 618 P.2d 616, 620 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing the
existence of an absolute privilege); Goldstein v. Serio, 496 So. 2d 412, 413-15 (La. App.
Ct. 1986) (holding that the affirmative defense of absolute privilege does not defeat a
malicious prosecution or abuse of process claim in the context of a case involving
complaint with disciplinary authority); see also COLO. R. CIV. P . 2 51.32(e) (2004)
(establishing a privilege from tort immunity in filing complaints of attorney misconduct).
122. See Preiser v. Rosenzweig, 646 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Pa. 1994) (holding that absolute
privilege does not apply to allegedly defamatory statements made by one attorney about
another in private arbitral proceeding conducted by special fee determination committee
of local bar association); Drummond, 618 P.2d at 620 (recognizing the existence of an
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Another feature of the interference torts that makes them such an
attractive alternative to another tort claim is the fact that the conduct in
question need not necessarily amount to an independent tort in order to
constitute improper interference. For example, the Restatement lists
unfounded litigation as an example of improper conduct that might
support a finding of tortious interference.126 Thus, an interference claim
might naturally serve as a substitute for a claim of wrongful initiation of
civil proceedings. The tort of wrongful initiation requires that the
allegedly baseless civil proceedings that were initiated first must have
been terminated in favor of the party bringing the wrongful initiation
claim. 127 If one adopts the view that a plaintiff need not be able to satisfy
every element of a separate tort in order to establish that the defendant’s
interference was improper, this requirement would not necessarily prove
to be a bar in the case of an interference claim filed prior to the conclusion
of the underlying lawsuit; assuming that the underlying lawsuit was filed
without probable cause and for an improper purpose, the defendant would
have violated the essential duty underlying the tort of wrongful
initiation.128
The danger in such cases is that the policy choices that courts have
previously made in establishing the contours of the other tort may be
undermined if an interference claim is permitted to serve as a substitute.
For example, each element of the tort of wrongful initiation of civil
proceedings serves an important purpose in maintaining the balance
between the interest in preventing the judicial system from being used for
the purpose of harassment and the interest in allowing access to the courts

126. Id. § 767 cmt. c (1977).
127. Although the term “malicious prosecution” is often used in a generic fashion, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts actually distinguishes between actions for malicious
prosecution and the wrongful use of civil proceedings. The most obvious distinction, of
course, is that the former tort involves the initiation of criminal proceedings, rather than
civil. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977). The Restatement (Second)
of Tort describes the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings as follows:
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of
civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful
civil proceedings if
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without the threat of retaliatory litigation. 129 The requirement that
probable cause exist before a proceeding can be initiated exists in order to
further the goal of preventing individuals from being the subject of
baseless allegations.130 In the case of defendant-attorneys, an attorney
need not believe that the client is actually likely to win in order to satisfy
the probable cause requirement.131 Thus, the requirement also protects the
ability of attorneys to advocate for their clients even when the attorney
believes the client is unlikely to prevail and increases the willingness of
attorneys to accept unpopular causes or advocate for changes in existing
law. 132 The requirement that a defendant must act for the purpose of
securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are
based is similarly geared toward preventing the judicial process from
being used because of ill will or forcing a settlement that has no relation to
the merits of the claim. 133 In the case of defendant-attorneys, the
requirement insures that an attorney is actually seeking to fulfill the
attorney’s duty of loyalty to the client, rather than acting to harass the
defendant or to coerce the settlement of another claim.134 The requirement
that the underlying proceedings have terminated in favor of the person
against whom they are brought helps insure that the underlying proceeding
truly was brought without probable cause and prevents the situation in
which a defendant is found liable for wrongful initiation only to actually
prevail on the underlying claim.135 In the case of defendant-attorneys, the
requirement works to prevent an attorney who is simultaneously facing a
wrongful initiation claim and representing his client in the underlying
proceeding from being inclined to protect his own interests rather than
those of his client and from ultimately becoming a fact witness, thus
forcing his withdrawal from his client’s matter.136
Allowing a plaintiff to bypass any of these requirements while
pursuing an interference claim against an attorney based upon the
attorney’s representation of a client could upset the balance struck by the
elements of the wrongful initiation tort.137 It could also have negative
consequences for the legal process in general and for the defendant-

129. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1994).
Ronald E. Mallen, An Attorney’s Liability for Malicious Prosecution: A Misunderstood
Tort, 46 INS. COUNSEL J. 407, 409 (1979).
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attorney’s client, who may lose her attorney’s undivided loyalty or the
services of her attorney altogether.
Permitting an interference claim to serve as a substitute for an abuse of
process claim against an attorney raises similar concerns. The general
purpose of the tort of abuse of process is to prevent parties from using a
legal process for something other than th e purpose for which the
procedure was designed.138 Like the interference torts, abuse of process is
a catch-all tort, designed “to cover improper uses of the judicial machinery
that d[o] not fit within the earlier established, but narrowly circumscribed,
action of malicious prosecution.” 139 At first blush, the dangers i n
undermining the goals of the abuse of process tort by permitting an
interference claim to lie for essentially the same allegedly wrongful
conduct would appear to be substantially less. However, in the case of a
defendant-attorney, the same concerns about insuring that clients have the
undivided loyalty of their attorneys that exist in the context of wrongful
initiation claims exist with respect to abuse of process claims. 140
Moreover, because an abuse of process claim may be founded upon a
variety of “processes” not covered by the wrongful initiation tort, the
potential to undermine the goal of zealous representation of a client’s
interests is greater. Perhaps not surprisingly, courts have generally been
more willing to afford attorneys an absolute immunity for abuse of process
claims than for wrongful initiation claims.141
Similar concerns exist with allowing a plaintiff to use an interference
claim to avoid the absolute privilege afforded to attorneys for defamatory
statements made in the course of judicial proceedings. In an effort to
preserve the ability of attorneys to advocate zealously on behalf of their
clients, courts have interpreted this privilege broadly so that it applies to
statements made in good faith anticipation of a judicial proceeding and in
the actual course of a judicial proceeding, so long as it is pertinent to the
matter in controversy.142 The existence of this absolute privilege reflects a
policy choice that the dangers of permitting a tort action based upon
statements having some relation to a judicial proceeding outweigh the
138. See Lyon v. May, 424 S.E.2d 655, 659 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that an abuse
of process claim would not lie where there was no evidence that a party tried to use a
process for anything other than its real purpose); Syl. Pt. 2, Wayne County Bank v.
Hodges, 338 S.E.2d 202 (W. Va. 1985) (“Generally, abuse of process consists of the
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occasional unfair result of affording immunity to attorneys whose
statements are made for some purpose other than promoting the interests
of justice.143 If, for example, a court were to hold that the privilege did not
apply to a claim of tortious interference involving defamatory statements,
rather than improper conduct, the court would be undermining the policy
choice previously made with respect to the privilege. Similarly, if a court
were to hold (as a few courts have) that truth, while a bar to a defamation
claim, is not necessarily a bar to an interference claim, 144 the court would
likewise be inviting the same dangers it had previously concluded were
sufficient to outweigh the benefits of permitting liability to attach.
Given the difficult choices that courts are forced to make with respect
to tort claims involving litigation conduct on the part of attorneys, the
danger of allowing a defendant to proceed with an interference claim in
place of a defective claim based on the same type of conduct that the other
tort seeks to prohibit becomes self-evident. While this same problem may
exist in any situation in which interference claims serve in the stead of
another tort claim, the concerns are particularly acute in the legal context
where the policy ramifications of permitting the claim to proceed may be
more substantial.
C. THE BENEFITS OF INTERFERENCE CLAIMS IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT

Despite the problems associated with the interference torts in the
context of a defendant-attorney engaged in what is arguably the
representation of a client, there are situations where recognition of the
torts may further the basic goals of tort law—deterrence of harmful
conduct and providing compensation for injured parties 145 —without
undermining the policy choices previously made with respect to other
bodies of law. Interference claims, like any tort claim, can, if properly
restrained, help promote society’s interests in fairly administering justice
and preventing the legal system from being used for improper purposes.
In the process, they may also serve as an additional deterrent to unethical
conduct on the part of attorneys. Interference claims may also be uniquely
situated to help preserve a relationship that society undoubtedly views as
deserving of protection from outside influences—the attorney-client
relationship.
1. USING TORT LAW TO DETER UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR
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consequences on the administration of justice.146 Judges and lawyers have
grown increasingly frustrated at the inability of lawyer civility codes, 147
the disciplinary process, 148 and judicial sanctions 149 to curb unethical
conduct during the litigation process. This frustration has led
commentators to suggest various non-traditional solutions to the problem
of unethical lawyers, including imposing harsher sentences on criminal
defendants whose attorneys abuse the judicial process. 150 The increased
use of tort law as a vehicle to curb overly zealous representation should,
therefore, hardly be considered surprising or revolutionary.151
Assuming one recognizes the potential for tort law to serve as a
deterrent to wrongful conduct, the question becomes whether the salutary
effects of recognizing tort claims based on wrongful litigation conduct
outweigh the risk of chilling legitimate advocacy. As a general matter,
courts have concluded that it does not. Aside from the frequent
observation that limited liability is essential to preserve the ability of
attorneys to advance the interests of their clients, the most common
justification for the general state of limited liability is that a remedy for
146 . See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy:
Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2104
(2003) (“While judges recognize the importance of zealous advocacy, they realize too
that zeal and efficiency in criminal proceedings are often inversely related.”).
147. Brenda Smith, Comment, Civility Codes: The Newest Weapons in the “Civil”
War over Proper Attorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV.
151, 162 (1998) (“[C]ivility codes fail to actually change attorney behavior or to set
higher standards.”).
148. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg.
71,670, 71,761 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205); Nikki A.
Ott & Heather F. Newton, A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3: How is It Used and What
Are Courts Doing About it?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 748-49 (2003) (“[C]urrent
scholarship agrees that Model Rule 8.3 is underenforced and does not act as a deterrent to
attorney misconduct.”); Hayden, supra note 2, at 1039 (arguing that there is “scant
evidence” that professional responsibility codes deter some forms of misconduct and
“plenty of evidence . . . that attorneys are not being deterred from such conduct by fear of
disciplinary action”); Judith Kilpatrick, Regulating the Litigation Immunity: New Power
and a Breath of Fresh Air for the Attorney Disciplinary System, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1069,
1091 (1992) (“Disciplinary sanctions have not been considered effective in catching and
preventing unethical conduct.”).
149. See Etienne, supra note 146, at 2109-10 (stating that individual sanctions such as
fines and contempt rulings are not often used by judges); Hayden, supra note 2, at 1039
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misconduct already exists in the form of “the discipline of the courts, the
bar associations, and the state.”152 Of course, Rule 11 sanctions and the
discipline of bar associations and the state rarely compensate an attorney
for the loss of an expected fee resulting from an interference; more
importantly, such “remedies” do not compensate a client for the
diminished quality of services he or she receives as a result of an
interference or the time, expense, and aggravation associated with finding
a new attorney if the interference has resulted in termination of the
attorney-client relationship.153 And while courts may have the inherent
authority to award attorneys’ fees for bad faith conduct against a party,
such action is rarely taken.154
As importantly, if the criticisms concerning the deterrent effect of
judicial sanctions and bar discipline are accurate, it is questionable
whether the public’s interest in securing justice, which is supposedly
served by the existence of an absolute litigator’s privilege, is vindicated by
relying solely on these mechanisms. Litigation abuses by attorneys have
harmful consequences not only for the attorneys’ opponents,155 but for the
legal profession and the administration of justice.156 The perception that
there are too many lawyers in practice who are willing to say or do
anything to win diminishes public confidence in the legal profession and
the legal process as a whole,157 leads to increasing dissatisfaction with the
practice of law among attorneys,158 and places an even greater burden on
152. Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994).
153. See Deborah L. Rhode, Opening Remarks: Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 458,
469-70 (2001) (“Seldom does the system impose requirements like reimbursement that
could benefit clients . . . .”).
154. Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221, 224 (Fla. 2002).
155. Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1028 (N.H. 1995) (“[W]hen a defense is
commenced maliciously or is based upon false evidence and perjury or is raised for an
improper purpose, the litigant is not made whole if the only remedy is reimbursement of
counsel fees.”).
156. Jonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A
Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 917
(1984).
157. Hayden, supra note 2, at 1020.
158. See J. Thomas Greene, A Kinder, Gentler Justice System?, 181 F.R.D. 559, 561
(1998) (“[T]he sense of dissatisfaction being experienced by many lawyers, in large part
has been brought on by an unsavory minority who have abused the system and employed
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already overburdened courts to deal with overzealous tactics. 159 If, as
others have charged, the state disciplinary agencies and reviewing state
supreme courts are underfunded160 or overly lenient in their imposition of
discipline,161 the current system does little to deter litigation abuses. If
these assumptions are correct, then it is difficult to see why conduct that
offends the rules of a game in which society has such a clear interest and
which causes immediate harm to opponents involved in the game should
not, in at least some instances, subject a defendant to liability.
Society’s interest in preserving the ability of attorneys to secure justice
for their clients is equally compelling. However, while most lawyers
would acknowledge the importance of being able to speak fearlessly on
behalf a client, one is left to wonder whether such an absolute privilege is
essential to protect this ability when it is the defendant-attorney’s conduct,
rather than his or her words, that causes the injury to the plaintiff. Any
representation involves speaking or writing on behalf of a client.
However, there is a fundamental distinction between wrongful conduct,
accomplished by words, and wrongful words themselves. The
Restatement’s recognition that the defamation privilege does not extend to
actions for malicious prosecution and wrongful initiation of civil
proceedings is proof of this. 162 In some respects then, the question of
when and in what form tortious interference claims against attorneys
should be recognized is simply a subset of the larger question of when and
in what form tort liability against attorneys should be allowed.
In light of the growing frustration over the use of so-called “Rambo”
litigation tactics,163 the legal profession may be at an appropriate point at
which to reconsider whether an absolute litigation privilege for all or most
intentional tort liability is essential to protect the ability of lawyers to act
fearlessly in order to secure justice for their clients or whether some form

and lawyers are perceived by themselves as well as the public as
dishonest, unethical, overwhelmingly materialistic, uncaring, and rude.
Id.
159. See Etienne, supra note 146, at 2104 (arguing that judges recognize that “zeal is a
‘cost’ of judicial efficiency that judges have an incentive to minimize”); Van Patten &
Willard, supra note 156, at 917 (noting the problem of congestion and delay in the court
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of qualified litigation immunity might accomplish the same goal. 164 For
the reasons discussed above, it may be that affording attorneys broad tort
immunity is actually counterproductive to the goal of insuring the ability
of attorneys to secure justice for their clients that such immunity seeks to
promote.165 Similarly, in those jurisdictions that extend the absolute
privilege to all intentional torts, save malicious prosecution and wrongful
initiation, it might be time to reconsider whether other intentional tort
theories might serve to advance important societal values not currently
served by the malicious prosecution and wrongful initiation torts. 166 As
argued in the following section, in some limited circumstances, the
interference torts may serve such a role.
2. PRESERVING THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Aside from the broad societal harm that results from unethical
litigation conduct, it remains to be considered whether the harm to an
individual plaintiff flowing from such conduct is of sufficient weight to
help counterbalance the important interest of preserving attorneys’ ability
to serve the interests of their clients. There are any number of potential
injuries an adversary may suffer as a result of unethical litigation conduct,
including increased time, money, and mental distress.167 Such injuries are
compensable where a defendant has wrongfully initiated a civil
proceeding,168 and most courts permit this cause of action against an
attorney.169 Therefore, it is difficult to see why, in theory, the same types
of harm that might naturally flow from an intentional interference with a
contractual relationship during the course of litigation are not significant
enough in at least some instances to justify liability, even where the
defendant-attorney’s conduct does not amount to the independent tort of
wrongful initiation.170

164. Kilpatrick, supra note 148, at 1094; see also Hayden, supra note 2, at 1042-43
(suggesting that states abandon the absolute litigator’s privilege to defame).
165. Hayden, supra note 2, at 1020.
166. See Kilpatrick, supra note 148, at 1093 (stating that the absolute litigation
privilege “causes harm and encourages irresponsible, if not unethical, conduct”); Hayden,
supra note 2, at 1043 (suggesting that the absolute privilege to defame be replaced with a
qualified privilege).
167. See Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1028 (N.H. 1995).
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There is one situation in particular for which the interference torts are
uniquely suited to address unethical litigation conduct: interference with
an attorney-client relationship. According to the Restatement, some
contractual interests receive more protection from outside interference
than others.171 Typically, this means that existing contracts are entitled to
more protection than mere prospective contractual relations and, at least in
some jurisdictions and instances, contracts terminable at will.172 However,
there is no reason why a consideration of the interest with which the
defendant has interfered must be confined to such a mechanical formula.
According to the Restatement, other factors to consider in assessing the
propriety of the defendant’s interference include the social interests in
both protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual
interests of the other, and the relations between the parties.173 This would
require consideration of the social utility of the private interests of the
persons involved, as well as a consideration of whether there is any kind
of significant relationship between any two of the three parties. 174 The
comments to the Restatement suggest that there may be certain kinds of
interests that are entitled to more protection from outside interference,
regardless of whether the relation in question is a contract terminable for
cause, a contract terminable at will, or a prospective contractual relation.
The attorney-client relationship would certainly seem to constitute the
type of significant relationship that would justify the creation of special
rules regarding interference by third parties. There are essentially two
competing strains in the law governing lawyers concerning just how
sacred such relationships should be from outside interference. The first,
while perhaps not encouraging others to induce a client to terminate a
relationship with an attorney, can be seen as at least being receptive to the
notion that mere intentional interference with such relationships is not
always improper. While attorney-client relationships are contractual in
nature, contract law treats them quite differently than it does other types of
contracts.175 There are numerous contractual provisions, such as noncompete agreements between lawyers176 and provisions limiting a client’s
ability to settle a matter without the approval of his or her attorney, 177 that
are void as against public policy when they impact attorney-client
relationships that would be perfectly acceptable if employed outside the
attorney-client relationship context. Most of these special contractual
rules are based on the goal of preserving a client’s unfettered right to
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counsel of his or her own choosing. 178 This principle of client choice is
deeply imbedded within the law governing lawyers and the rules of
professional responsibility.179
Extrapolating from these principles, one could assume that the
attorney-client relationship is entitled to significantly less protection than
other relationships based on the fact that it is terminable at the will of the
client and the fact that ethical rules and case law go to such lengths to
insure a client’s ability to exercise that right. Thus, for example, courts
have consistently held that an attorney who provides advice to a
represented client that leads the client to terminate the client’s relationship
with an attorney does not improperly interfere with that relationship,
provided that the attorney acts in good faith. 180 This conclusion is only
justified, however, with respect to interferences that, at least in the client’s
view, may ultimately benefit the client.
The law governing lawyers takes a much dimmer view of interferences
that may actually adversely impact an attorney’s ability to adequately
represent a client. The law governing lawyers contains several rules that
seek to protect the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship and seek to
protect clients from being influenced by other individuals, particularly
other lawyers. For example, the attorney-client privilege exists in part so
that clients can provide full information to their attorney sufficient to
enable adequate representation without fear of disclosure to outside
parties. 181 The case law is replete with references to the special
relationship between a client and attorney, the client’s “advocate and
champion.”182 The rules of professional responsibility also speak to the
special relationship between attorney and client and the need to protect
such relationships from potentially harmful outside influences, particularly
those of other attorne y s . T h e A B A Model Rules of Professional
Conduct’s prohibition against direct contact with persons represented by
other lawyers involved in the matter, for example, reflects a concern over
the potential for one lawyer to influence the decision of another lawyer’s
client.183 Indeed, the comments to the relevant rule expressly caution
against the dangers of interference with the attorney-client relationship by
other lawyers.184

178 . Robert M. Wilcox, Enforcing Lawyer Non-Competition Agreements While
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In short, the law governing lawyers reflects a deep concern for the
potential of adversaries to adversely impact the ability of an attorney to
adequately represent his or her client. If one is willing to recognize these
prohibitions on outside interferences as expressions of public policy, 185 it
is clear that society wishes to encourage the stability of attorney-client
relationships in this specific context. Indeed, this societal recognition that
client choice is an essential component of the administration of justice is
reflected in the rationales underlying the absolute litigator’s privilege. As
mentioned, one of the justifications for the privilege is that the possibility
of attorney liability might lead to the disruption or destruction of an
attorney-client relationship, thus hindering the administration of justice. 186
That being the case, interference claims, if properly restricted, can protect
interests broader than the mere contractual interests of the attorney and
client.187
None of the foregoing should be read as implying that an interference
claim stemming from an interference with a different kind of relationship
i n a l e g a l s e t t i n g should not be actionable under appropriate
circumstances. There may be instances in which interference claims
might be entirely appropriate. However, an interference with an attorneyclient relationship is a situation in which recognition of a tort claim is
most easily justified. The argument that an attorney needs to be free from
the specter of an intentional tort claim in order to adequately represent the
interests of a client holds little weight when the attorney is engaging in
unethical conduct with the intent of preventing an opposing attorney from
fulfilling that same duty for his or her client.
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that allowing a cause of action for
tortious interference with an attorney-client relationship in the litigation
context would lead to a dramatic increase in the number of such claims.
The expense of pursuing any legal action and the speculative quality of
damages would likely serve as a disincentive for many non-lawyers to
bring such claims based on the misconduct of an opposing attorney that
results in a decrease in the quality of representation or a complete
termination of such a relationship. 188 To the extent non-lawyers are
willing to assume these risks and to the extent that the availability of such
a remedy might serve to deter litigation abuses, they are the most
appropriate parties to bring such claims. Because of the cost and difficulty
of hiring an attorney to pursue such a claim, the most likely plaintiffs in
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such cases would be other lawyers who have been denied an anticipated
fee as a result of an interference. Given the fact that most rules
concerning litigation abuses are designed to protect adverse parties from
misconduct, rather than their lawyers, non-lawyers would be the more
appropriate vehicle to vindicate the societal interest in fair play during
litigation. However, because a discharged lawyer’s damages are likely to
be less speculative than those of an aggrieved client, the availability of an
interference claim on the part of an attorney might have a greater deterrent
effect than in the case of non-attorneys and should thus be allowed in
appropriate cases.
IV. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE INTERFERENCE TORTS SO THAT THEY DO
NOT INTERFERE WITH THE PRACTICE OF LAW
While interference claims may play a role in deterring attorney
misconduct and compensating plaintiffs for the injuries flowing from such
misconduct, there still remains the problem of ensuring that legitimate
advocacy is not chilled by the recognition of such a cause of action. There
is also the related problem of ensuring that interference claims do not
undermine the policy choices embodied in other bodies of law. The
following Part proposes a redefinition of the interference torts for use in
the context of litigation misconduct resulting in interference with a
contractual relation.
A. MOVING BEYOND THE “ONE SIZE FITS ALL” APPROACH

The first step in constructing a workable rule is to move beyond the
approach of most courts that applies the same legal test for determining
the ultimate propriety of an interference, regardless of the type of interest
in question. Given the difficulties inherent in weighing each of the seven
factors listed in the Restatement in each and every case in order to arrive at
a conclusion as to whether a defendant’s interference was improper, courts
have largely forsaken the Restatement’s approach and tried to construct
more simple tests.189 The problem with such an approach—regardless of
the rule that ultimately emerges—is that it may fail to adequately take into
account the fact that society may view certain forms of intentional
interference as inherently more or less wrongful, depending upon the type
of interest at issue.
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authors realized that a determination of impropriety in one case would not
necessarily be controlling in a future case. 191 However, they did believe
that, in time, crystallized privileges and rules defining when an
interference is improper could develop. 192 According to the authors, the
determination of whether an interference is improper “depends upon a
judgment and choice of values in each situation,”193 therefore there is no
reason why a court could not, in certain situations, make those judgments
and choices and construct clear rules to guide the analysis of interference
claims in particular situations.
B. REDEFINING THE INTENT ELEMENT

In keeping with this approach of defining “improper” interference
differently for different types of situations, the next step is to redefine the
intent element in the specific context of an attorney or adverse party
charged with interference with an attorney-client relationship preliminary
t o a p r oposed judicial proceeding, in the institution of a judicial
proceeding, or during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding.194
At present, a defendant acts with intent for purposes of the interference
torts if the defendant desires to interfere or knows that interference is
certain or substantially certain to occur. 195 In the specific context of an
interference stemming from the representation of another client, the intent
element should be redefined so as to exclude situations where the
interference was simply incidental in character.196
This redefinition is important for several reasons. First, where the
interference is not desired by the defendant but is simply known to be a
consequence, the injury to the plaintiff is more likely to be a more indirect
consequence of the defendant’s actions than the actions of the plaintiff’s
contractual partner.197 According to the Restatement, the fact that the
defendant did not desire to interfere, generally speaking, makes the
defendant’s conduct less inherently wrongful than in the situation where
the defendant desires to interfere.198 According to the comments, if the
defendant acts with the sole desire of interfering, the interference “is

191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Id.
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almost certain to be held improper.” 199 Even if interference is only a
primary motive, this fact “may carry substantial weight in the balancing
process” concerning the propriety of the defendant’s actions. 200 In the
specific context of an interference with an attorney-client relationship, the
fact that the defendant actually intended to interfere with the relationship
makes it more likely that the societal interest in insuring that a client is
adequately represented by an attorney of his or her choice would be
offended.
The redefinition is also important so as not to unduly restrict the ability
of attorneys to represent their clients. Attorneys routinely take action on
behalf of their clients that they can reasonably anticipate may interfere
with the relationships an adverse party has with others. The decision to
file a lawsuit, for example, carries with it an understanding that the other
party will incur time and expense that may impede its ability to live up to
other obligations. Similarly, an attorney may know with substantial
certainty that exposing opposing counsel as incompetent during trial will
cause the other party to fire his or her attorney. Redefining the intent
element makes it less likely that mere knowledge as to the existence of a
relationship and the harm that is likely to ensue after taking action in the
best interest of a client can ever amount to improper interference.
C. REQUIRING A SHOWING OF INDEPENDENTLY WRONGFUL CONDUCT

Even where an attorney acts with the specific intent of interfering with
an attorney-client relationship, such intent should not render an
interference wrongful absent some type of independently wrongful
conduct. Again, the requirement of some additional indicia of
wrongfulness apart from mere intentional interference is necessary to
prevent attorneys from being chilled in their representation of clients.
When an attorney moves to disqualify opposing counsel, for example, the
attorney desires to interfere with an attorney-client relationship.
Assuming the attorney has brought the motion with a good faith belief that
it is not frivolous or has not engaged in any other type of wrongful
conduct, such intentional interference is not wrongful. It is the practice of
law.
In contrast, there will be instances in which an attorney’s client is the
one who actually desires to interfere and the attorney is simply following
the client’s instructions in taking some action during the course of
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action where it would amount to a violation of the law or the rules of
professional responsibility.201 Therefore, the additional requirement that
a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct was independently
wrongful is necessary to vindicate society’s interests in zealous, but
ethical, advocacy.
Part V provides some specific examples of how the concept of
“independently wrongful” litigation conduct might be defined in various
situations.202 However, as a general matter the term should mean that the
defendant’s conduct was wrongful in the sense that it is proscribed by
some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, c o m m o n l a w , o r o t h e r
determinable legal standard. 203 These references should be sufficiently
clear to put a reasonable person on notice as to prohibited conduct. As is
the case in Texas, the defendant’s conduct should not have to be unlawful
in the literal sense to be “independently tortious.” Instead, it should be
sufficient that a defendant has violated the duty established by the legal
standard.204 In most cases it is reasonable and simply easier to assume that
some other recognized legal standard establishes a minimum level of
proper conduct. At the same time, such sources are appropriate references
from which one can base a defensible conclusion as to whether the
defendant’s conduct is at odds with substantial societal interests.
In other situations, a violation of a lawyer ethics code could amount to
an independently wrongful conduct. According to the Restatement, one
factor to be considered in determining whether an interference is improper
i s whether the defendant’s actions amount to “fair play” that is
“sanctioned by the rules of the game.” 205 The Restatement thereby
suggests that conduct that violates a professional ethical code of conduct
might help support a conclusion that a defendant has improperly interfered
with another’s relation.206 If litigation is the game in question, lawyer
ethics codes help establish the rules. Ordinarily, it might be problematic
to recognize a professional ethics code as establishing general standards of
proper behavior, either because the rules are vague, because they do not
implicate broader social concerns, or because they are designed for the
benefit of members of the profession rather than the protection of the
public.207 These concerns are alleviated in the case of legal ethics rules
that regulate litigation conduct. The rules concerning proper conduct in
the course of representation (the conflict of interest rules, the rules
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regarding candor to the court and opposing parties, etc.) are clearly
designed for the welfare of the judicial system and those individuals who
interact with attorneys during this process.208 These standards are adopted
and enforced by the highest courts of the states. Courts have relied on
these sources of public policy in other contexts to define what constitutes
proper behavior.209 Accordingly, conduct in violation of these rules most
decidedly offends important societal interests and, when appropriate,
should constitute improper conduct for purposes of an interference claim.
This generic independently tortious standard should not apply,
however, where its application would undermine the core values
associated with another area of the law that is designed specifically to
cover the type of conduct in question.210 This notion will be fleshed out in
greater detail in Part V, but a quick example will help illustrate this
approach. Currently, virtually every jurisdiction recognizes an absolute
privilege for attorneys to make defamatory statements during the course of
a proceeding.211 For good or for ill, this is the well-established rule and it
is based on a balancing of competing interests. Assume that in the course
of a deposition, one attorney makes false and defamatory statements about
opposing counsel during a heated exchange. The statements are made
with the specific intent of interfering with the other attorney’s relationship
with her client, but are relevant to the deposition. The attorney would
enjoy an absolute privilege in a defamation action. 212 One can question
whether this should be the case, but unless and until courts are willing to
alter the rule, a plaintiff should not be permitted to circumvent the
privilege unless the defamation tort does not address the plaintiff’s
specific injury.213 Unfortunately for the defamed attorney in this instance,
the tort of defamation exists in large measure to prevent injuries to a
208. In contrast, it might be argued that some of the rules of professional responsibility
regulating the business of law, such as the rules regarding multi-jurisdictional practice,
are designed primarily to serve the interests of existing members of the profession. See
Barton, supra note 161, at 1233-34.
209. See Thompto v. Coburn’s, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1097, 1120 (N.D. Iowa 1994)
(finding that Iowa’s Code of Professional Responsibility is a source of public policy for
purposes of a wrongful discharge claim); Chapman v. Adia Servs., 688 N.E.2d 604, 609
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating that Ohio’s Code of Professional Responsibility is a source
of public policy for purposes of a wrongful discharge claim); General Dynamics Corp. v.
Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 498 (Cal. 1994) (“Some (but not all) of [lawyers’]

36

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL E THICS

[VOL. 18:0000

plaintiff’s reputation that deter others from associating with the
plaintiff.214 Surely, by extending the absolute privilege to defame to
attorneys, courts have realized that one of those who might be deterred
from dealing with a defamed lawyer is the lawyer’s own client. As
recognizing an interference claim in this instance would undermine the
policy choice previously made in virtually every jurisdiction, it should not
be recognized in this instance.215
This is not to say that an interference claim should not be permitted
where a court has extended the defamation privilege to other causes of
action. The absolute privilege regarding defamatory statements is a
special case and involves a rule that is so well-established and so
dominates the field of speech-related litigation misconduct that it can be
said to almost pre-empt other tort claims.216 Where, however, the alleged
wrong consists of wrongful conduct, accomplished by words (such as
knowingly filing a complaint containing false and defamatory allegations),
courts have been more willing to recognize the potential for liability. 217
Even where courts have extended the absolute privilege to other tort
actions, it should be recognized that the privileges in these other areas did
not originally exist at common law and are not nearly as well-established
as the defamation privilege.218 Consequently, courts should not be nearly
as reluctant to reconsider prior holdings extending the privilege to other
causes of action as they might be with respect to the defamation privilege.
V. ATTORNEY LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE: LITIGATION
TACTICS AS INTERFERENCE
The following Part examines four different situations in which an
attorney might face liability for tortiously interfering with a relationship
while, at least in theory, acting on behalf of a client during the course of
litigation. These cases illustrate the ease with which an interference claim
can be asserted in place of, or in addition to, a more obvious cause of
action. More importantly, they illustrate the tension between permitting
recovery for the improper interference with contractual relationships and
permitting attorneys to engage in the practice of law without fear of
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (defining a defamatory statement as
one that “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of
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liability from opposing parties or counsel. Finally, they illustrate how the
proposed reformulation of the interference torts in this particular context
can be accomplished without upsetting other important policies.
A. FILING SUIT AS A FORM OF IMPROPER INTERFERENCE

While an interference claim could conceivably lie for any number of
actions taken during the litigation process, 219 perhaps the most obvious
basis for such a claim is the decision to file a lawsuit. The most logical
tort action stemming from the filing of a lawsuit would naturally be
malicious prosecution or wrongful initiation of civil proceedings.
However, a tortious interference claim could potentially be more viable.
First, as currently defined, the intent element could easily be
established in most cases because one necessary or likely consequence of
the filing of a lawsuit may also be the interference with an existing or
prospective contractual relationship.220 Second, while attorneys enjoy an
absolute privilege from a defamation action for statements made during
the course of a judicial proceeding, in a majority of jurisdictions they
nonetheless potentially remain subject for wrongfully initiating legal
proceedings.221 In some instances, however, a wrongful initiation suit
may be barred by existing law; for example, the fact that the proceeding
on which the claim is based has not yet terminated in favor of the person
against whom the charge is brought would ordinarily bar a wrongful
initiation claim. 222 Under the “independently tortious” standard used in
some jurisdictions, this failure to satisfy an element of the wrongful
initiation claim might not bar an interference claim based on the same
conduct.223 Unless a court were to define the contours of an interference
claim so that they tracked the elements of a wrongful initiation claim, a
plaintiff could theoretically state an interference cause of action, despite
the fact that the underlying proceeding has not yet terminated, as long as
the defendant acted with an improper purpose or used improper means.
A 2003 opinion from the Oregon Court of Appeals wrestled with these
issues. In Mantia v. Hanson, the plaintiff sued one of its former
employees for tortious interference as a result of the employee’s filing of
supposedly frivolous claims as part of an attempt to interfere with the
plaintiff’s business.224 In addition, the plaintiff asserted the same claim
against the defendant-law firm for asserting the claims on behalf of the
law firm’s client. 225 As the allegedly baseless claims had not been
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claim of wrongful initiation of civil proceedings would have been
barred.226 The question facing the court then was whether a tortious
interference claim could nonetheless lie based upon the identical conduct.
Making the matter more complicated was the fact that Oregon law was
far from clear on the subject of attorney liability stemming from actions
occurring during the litigation process. Indeed, over twenty years earlier,
the same court dismissed a wrongful initiation claim against an attorney,
who had allegedly instituted a civil action without probable cause, because
the plaintiff had failed to allege that the other proceedings had terminated,
but allowed a tortious interference claim based upon the same conduct to
proceed.227 However, in subsequent decisions, the court extended the
absolute privilege to publish defamatory statements in the course of, or as
part of, judicial proceedings to tort actions outside the defamation
context. 228 This included, in one instance, an interference action
stemming from allegedly defamatory statements.229 Additionally, in one
of these later decisions, the court extended the absolute litigation privilege
to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claim
stemmed, in part, from the filing of legal proceedings 230 —conduct that
might more logically have sounded under a wrongful initiation theory.
In light of the seemingly conflicting case law and the fact that the
defendant’s underlying claim in Mantia had not been resolved at the time
the plaintiff brought his interference claim, the court was confronted with
essentially two questions: (1) whether to extend the absolute privilege to
all tort claims (including interference claims) based on the wrongful
initiation of legal proceedings, with the exception of wrongful initiation
claims; and (2) whether the institution of legal proceedings could amount
to the wrongful means necessary to support an interference claim, despite
the fact that the underlying proceedings had not yet terminated.
In attempting to reconcile the conflicting case law, the court chose not
to extend the absolute privilege to all tort claims, save wrongful initiation
of legal proceedings.231 Thus, a tortious interference claim remained at
least a theoretical possibility for the plaintiff in Mantia. However, the
court also limited the potential reach of the interference cause of action by
defining the term “improper means” in such a way that it tracked exactly
the elements of a wrongful initiation claim:
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[T]he prosecution of unfounded litigation constitutes
actionable “improper means” for purposes of tortious
interference where (1) the plaintiff in the antecedent
proceedings lacked probable cause to prosecute those
proceedings; (2) the primary purpose of those proceedings
was something other than to secure an adjudication of the
claims asserted there; and (3) the antecedent proceedings
were terminated in favor of the party now asserting the
tortious interference claim.232
Because the plaintiff in Mantia had filed his tortious interference claim
prior to the time the defendant’s underlying claim had been adjudicated,
his tortious interference claim failed as a matter of law. 233 By defining
“improper means” in this fashion, the court prevented the interference
torts from undermining the policy judgments previously made with respect
to the tort of wrongful initiation of civil proceedings.
Even if the plaintiff in Mantia could have garnered enough evidence to
create a jury question on the defendant’s allegedly improper means, the
approach described in Part IV quite likely would have prevented the
plaintiff from reaching the jury on the interference claim. If the intent
element is redefined so that a defendant must actually desire to interfere, it
is unlikely that the court would have ruled the defendant in Mantia
intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s business relationships.
According to the complaint, the law firm
pursue[d] the frivolous claims of plaintiff Mantia against
defendant Hanson . . . with the intent to interfere with
defendant’s business by requiring Hanson to devote
substantial time and money defending against the false
claims of the plaintiff, by ruining Hanson’s business, or by
putting Hanson out of business.234
The allegation that the law firm filed an action on behalf of its client with
this intent seems dubious at best if, by “intent,” Hanson was alleging that
the firm desired these results. Instead, it is more likely that the law firm
knew with substantial certainty that Hanson might face these potential
problems as a result of the litigation. While the client may have desired to
put Hanson out of business, absent some evidence of bad blood between
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purpose in bringing a lawsuit without hindering their willingness to accept
unpopular causes.235
B. IMPROPER HANDLING OF SETTLEMENT OFFERS AS A FORM OF
IMPROPER INTERFERENCE

Once litigation is fully underway, interference claims can materialize
in any number of possible ways. A 2004 decision from the Arizona Court
of Appeals illustrates the risks that attorneys may face when attempting to
obtain the best deal possible for their clients (and themselves). In Safeway
Insurance Co. v. Guerrero,236 Roush, the defendant-attorney, was accused
of tortiously interfering with the contract between an insurer and its
insured in a somewhat complicated insurance matter. Specifically, Roush
represented the mother and guardian of an injured party in her action
against the driver of an automobile. The driver was insured by Safeway
Insurance Co. under a policy for coverage up to $15,000. As it turned out,
the injured party’s injuries were in excess of $7 million. Initially, Roush
made a settlement offer on behalf of his client that included a demand of
policy limits in the amount of $15,000. While Safeway contended that it
accepted the offer, Roush claimed to have withdrawn the offer prior to
Safeway’s acceptance. 237 According to Safeway, Roush withdrew the
offer because he realized that he stood to collect significantly less under
his contingent fee agreement if the policy limits were paid, and therefore
“devised a scheme that would allow [him] to make a substantially larger
fee.”238 Specifically, Roush allegedly withdrew the offer for the purpose
of manufacturing a bad faith claim on the part of the insured that would
enable Roush’s client to enter into an agreement (known in Arizona as a
“Damron/Morris agreement”) with the insured whereby Roush’s client
would be able to pursue the insured’s bad faith claim against Safeway.239
Arizona follows the Restatement’s approach to interference claims;
therefore, Safeway had the burden of establishing not only that Roush had
intentionally interfered with Safeway’s contract with its insured, but that
Roush had acted improperly.240 The court offered two possible bases on
which a reasonable juror could conclude that Roush had improperly
interfered. In one portion of the opinion, the court stated that Roush had
allegedly misrepresented his client’s intent to settle in order to generate a
bad faith claim against the insurer. 241 According to the Restatement,
misrepresentation is a form of improper conduct sufficient to support a
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accomplish the same result through more suitable means. 242 Thus,
because Roush had allegedly engaged in misrepresentation as part of a
scheme to interfere with the insurer’s relationship with its insured, Roush
had acted intentionally and improperly.
Had the court concluded its analysis at this point, there would be little
to criticize, unless one is of the opinion that an attorney should always be
shielded from liability to an opposing party for actions taken during the
course of litigation. 243 A s a l l e g e d , R o u s h h a d e n g a g e d i n
misrepresentation with the specific intent of interfering with the
relationship between the insurer and its insured. While garden-variety
misrepresentation could certainly constitute improper means, Roush’s
alleged actions were all the more wrongful because they involved
unethical litigation conduct. “Puffing” about a client’s intentions as to an
acceptable settlement in order to pressure the other side into offering a
better deal might be an accepted convention in negotiation.244 However,
there is a fundamental difference between this type of action, and the
assertion of a false desire to settle in order to drive a wedge between one’s
negotiation partner and that partner’s contractual partner in order to make
it appear as if the negotiation partner is actually the party negotiating in
bad faith. The attorney in the former situation might be playing within the
rules of a tough game. The attorney in the latter situation has committed a
foul that smacks of misrepresentation.245 If one is willing to recognize the
existence of tort liability to opposing parties for acts occurring during the
litigation process, Roush’s actions, as alleged, amounted to improper
interference.
Instead of stopping here, however, the court pressed on and
determined that, according to the insurer’s allegations, Roush’s actions
were improper because he had no basis for entering into the bad faith
agreement with the insured. The crux of the court’s reasoning is that
Roush engaged in the type of unfounded litigation that the Restatement
cautions against.246 Roush’s alleged reason for withdrawing the settlement
offer was that he planned to pursue a products liability action against the
manufacturer of the automobile and did not want the driver unrepresented
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c.
243. See infra notes 274-278 and accompanying text.
244. See MODEL RULES Rule 4.1 cmt. 2.
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as an “empty chair.” 247 Unfortunately for Roush, this was not a
permissible reason for withdrawing the settlement offer and entering into
an agreement with the driver concerning the bad faith claim. While
Arizona law permits parties to enter into the type of agreements that
Roush’s client and the driver entered into concerning the bad faith claim
(the Damron/Morris agreement), they are only permitted to do so under
limited circumstances.248 Because the desire to avoid facing an “empty
chair” is not a permissible basis for entering into a Damron/Morris
agreement, Roush had, in effect, wrongfully initiated a legal proceeding
by being a party to the Damron/Morris agreement. 249 Thus, a jury
question existed as to whether his actions were improper.250
As a jurisprudential matter, the problem with the court’s analysis in
this regard is that it was simply unnecessary. Roush’s act of interference
was his withdrawal of the settlement offer. His goal in withdrawing the
offer was to manufacture a bad faith claim. And he accomplished this
goal by misrepresenting his client’s intent to settle. Once one reaches this
conclusion, there is simply no reason to analyze whether Roush had a
legitimate reason for misrepresenting his client’s intent or whether the bad
faith claim was cognizable under existing law. All of the recognized
privileges for interference condition the existence of the privilege on
honest behavior.251 In short, it does not further the purpose of tort law to
inquire into why an attorney has made a false statement of fact with the
desire to interfere with a contractual relationship once it has been
established that the attorney has in fact done so.
On a broader level, the problem with classifying Roush’s decision to
enter into a bad faith agreement as an independent basis for a finding of
wrongful conduct is that it could potentially chill legitimate advocacy. As
the court’s decision makes clear, the insurer’s interference claim
essentially tracked a wrongful initiation claim. 252 However, it is not
entirely clear that Roush’s actions actually amounted to the wrongful
initiation of civil proceedings as that tort is defined at common law.
According to the Restatement, an attorney is liable for the tort only where
the attorney does not reasonably believe that a claim is valid under
applicable law and asserts the claim for an improper purpose. 253 The
decision contains numerous references to the fact that Roush’s actions
went beyond the “established” and “accepted” boundaries of Arizona law
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on the subject,254 thus leading one to believe Roush lacked probable cause
to proceed. However, the fact remains that the trial court actually
approved the reasonableness of the agreement between Roush’s client and
the insured.255 Thus, the trial judge at least did not believe Roush had
exceeded the accepted boundaries of Arizona law.
More importantly, at the time the insurer filed the interference claim,
the underlying bad faith claim was still pending.256 While the underlying
bad faith claim was decided in favor of the insurer prior to the decision in
Safeway Ins. Co., that decision was still under appeal at the time of the
opinion.257 Thus, the proceeding that was allegedly initiated without
probable cause had not been terminated.258 Under the majority rule, these
facts would have been fatal to a wrongful initiation claim had the insurer
brought such a claim.259 However, by allowing the interference claim to
act as a substitute for a flawed wrongful initiation claim, the Arizona
Court of Appeals reached a result that the Oregon Court of Appeals had
strained to avoid in Mantia v. Hanson.260
Roush raised several additional arguments in defense of the propriety
of his actions. Perhaps the most obvious was that, as an attorney, Roush
had an ethical duty to maximize recovery for his client.261 Thus, Roush
argued, if he was zealously representing his client as was his duty, he
could not have interfered improperly. 262 The court dismissed this
argument, noting that, while maximizing recovery may be part of a
lawyer’s duty, that duty is bound by a lawyer’s duty to represent a client
within the confines of the law and ethical rules. 263 Roush also raised
several privilege arguments, similar to those at issue in Mantia v.
Hanson.264 First, Roush argued that the only cause of action that Arizona
law permitted opposing parties or counsel to bring against an attorney was

254. See, e.g., Safeway Ins. Co., 83 P.3d at 567.
255. Himes v. Safeway Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 74, 78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). This decision
was subsequently vacated on appeal. Id. at 88.
256. Safeway Ins. Co., 83 P.3d at 563.
257. Id.
258. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a proceeding is not terminated
until the final disposition of the appeal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 cmt. j.
259. Id. § 674 Reporter’s Note (noting that the Restatement’s rule represents the
majority rule and listing Arizona as a state that follows the majority approach); see
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malicious prosecution.265 Earlier decisions had seemed to adopt just such
a sweeping rule. 266 The court quickly dispensed with this argument,
however, finding that the statements from prior decisions simply
amounted to dicta.267
Roush also made a more narrow privilege argument. Specifically, he
argued that the absolute privilege recognized in Arizona for defamatory
statements made in the course of judicial proceedings should also apply to
interference claims.268 While acknowledging the continued validity of the
absolute privilege to defame in the context of a judicial proceeding, the
court noted that the insurer’s interference claim more closely resembled a
claim of wrongful initiation of civil proceedings than a claim of
defamation.269 The insurer was not primarily complaining about what
Roush said, but rather what Roush did, i.e., manufacturing a bad faith
claim for an improper purpose. 270 Thus, it was Roush’s conduct that
constituted the basis of the interference claim. 271 The court explained that
if it were to extend the absolute privilege to defame to such a situation, it
would create a conflict with Arizona case law, which recognized a cause
of action against an attorney for wrongfully initiating civil proceedings;
thus, the court permitted the insurer’s interference claim to proceed .272
This distinction between speech and conduct is a sensible one.
Extending the absolute privilege applicable to defamatory statements is
only desirable where the interference claim more logically resembles a
defamation claim. The court’s willingness not to blindly extend the
privilege to this situation is to be commended, as is the court’s recognition
that zealous advocacy should not automatically be a defense to a tort
action by an opposing party. However, by defining “improper means” in
the manner the court did, the court allowed the plaintiff to bypass the very
carefully-constructed rules relating to wrongful initiation claims and, in
the process, undermined the policy choices previously made with respect
to that tort. The elements of the wrongful initiation tort have been
constructed too carefully to allow an interference claim, based upon the
same allegedly wrongful conduct, to serve as a substitute for such a claim,
unless there is some value the interference claim can advance that is not
advanced by the wrongful initiation tort. As such, the fact that Roush
265. Safeway Ins. Co., 83 P.3d at 565-66.
266. Lewis v. Swenson, 617 P.2d 69, 72 (Ariz. 1980); Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 943

2005]

ATTORNEY LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE

45

allegedly engaged in independently wrongful conduct by engaging in
“unfounded litigation” should not, by itself, have been sufficient to allow
the interference claim to proceed.
In contrast, the fact that Roush allegedly engaged in misrepresentation
with the specific intent of interfering with the insurer’s relationship with
its insured should be sufficient to constitute a case of tortious interference.
Recognizing a cause of action in this context would further the goals of
deterrence and compensation without undermining any existing body of
law.
C. USE OF THE DISQUALIFICATION RULES AS INTERFERENCE

With the above examples, the defendant-attorneys allegedly used the
litigation process to interfere with the plaintiffs’ relationships with those
other than their attorneys. In some instances, however, a defendantattorney may use the litigation process to drive a wedge between an
opposing party and his or her attorney in an effort to advance the cause of
his or her client. 273 In Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes &
Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 274 an insurance
company involved in a bad faith action certified to the trial court its intent
to call as a witness at trial one of the attorneys from the law firm
representing the opposing party. The insurer then moved to disqualify the
law firm from representing the opposing party.275 After the court granted
the insurer’s motion, the insurer never called the attorney as a witness and,
in fact, never even bothered to subpoena the attorney as a witness or notify
the court that it would not be calling the attorney as a witness. 276 The law
firm then sued the insurer for tortiously interfering with its relationship
with its client.277 The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the absolute
litigation privilege applicable to defamation actions applied to any act
occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether
273. These situations need to be distinguished from those in which an attorney files an
ethics complaint against an attorney simply out of spite or a desire to harm the other
attorney. See Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.E.2d 4 (Ill. 2000) (involving a
tortious interference claim stemming from two attorneys in a law firm notifying the state
bar that another attorney in the firm had been questioned about the creation of a forged
document).
274. 639 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994).
275. Id. at 607. The defendant in the ensuing tortious interference action was the
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the act involved a defamatory statement or other tortious behavior. 278
Hence, the law firm’s interference action was barred.
Similarly, in Drummond v. Stahl,279 the defendant-attorney moved to
disqualify opposing counsel on the basis of a conflict of interest and filed
an ethics charge with the state bar on the same grounds.280 Because of the
delay in the litigation associated with the motion and investigation of the
complaint, opposing counsel was fired by his client. 281 The state bar
ultimately concluded that there was no conflict of interest, although
counsel for the bar concluded that the question was a difficult one and that
the defendant-attorney had brought the complaint in good faith. 282 The
discharged attorney subsequently brought an action against the defendantattorney, alleging that the defendant had intentionally and maliciously
interfered with the attorney’s relationship with his client by filing the
motion to disqualify and bringing the ethics complaint. 283 Although the
Arizona Court of Appeals did not extend the absolute privilege to cover all
tort actions, i t concluded that the absolute privilege applying to
defamatory statements made in the course of litigation should apply to the
interference claim as well as the defamation claim. 284
This pair of cases illustrates both the potential utility and potential
dangers of permitting tortious interference claims to lie against attorneys
for conduct occurring during the course of representation. In reaching its
conclusion in Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell,
P.A., the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that “[j]ust as participants in
litigation must be free to engage in unhindered communication, so too
must those participants be free to use their best judgment in prosecuting or
defending a lawsuit without fear of having to defend their actions in a
subsequent civil action for misconduct.” 285 By that same logic, a
defendant involved in litigation should enjoy the same immunity if the
defendant decides to file a counterclaim or cross complaint for strategic
purposes. Yet, in many jurisdictions, filing such an action would amount
to the institution of a proceeding, thus forming the basis for a wrongful
initiation claim, assuming the other elements of the tort were satisfied.286
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 608.
618 P.2d 616 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
Id. at 618.
The court characterized the turn of events as involving the client “request[ing]”
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However, because filing a motion to disqualify does not amount to the
institution of a proceeding, a wrongful initiation claim would not be
available. 287 An abuse of process claim might not have succeeded because
there was no indication that the defendant filed the motion to disqualify
the law firm primarily t o a c c o m p l i s h a p u r p o s e f o r w h i c h the
disqualification process was not intended.288 That being the case, the only
potentially viable claim the plaintiff i n Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie,
Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. might have been able to assert was the
tortious interference claim. The timing of events suggests that the
defendant never actually intended to call a member of the opposing law
firm as a witness and that the defendant intentionally deceived the court.
If that is the case, then the defendant not only deceived the court but did so
with the intent of forcing the law firm to withdraw, thereby denying the
law firm its anticipated fee and, more importantly, the client its chosen
counsel.
This would seem to be precisely the type of situation for which the
interference torts exist. The defendant’s actions smack of both wrongful
initiation of civil proceedings and abuse of process, but arguably
amounted to neither. Both torts are designed to prevent the litigation
process from being used improperly. An interference claim in this
situation would more closely resemble an abuse of process action than a
wrongful initiation action, given the fact that the abuse of process tort is
much broader in terms of the processes that can form the basis for such
claims.289 Yet, if one recognizes attorney-client relationships as having
special inherent value and deserving of increased protection from
adversarial interference, recognizing an interference claim in this context
would promote a value that the abuse of process tort is not specifically
designed to promote.290 The paradigmatic abuse of process case involves
a defendant filing a motion for the purpose of coercing the plaintiff into
settling some other dispute.291 Yet, if one views the loss of the benefits of
an attorney-client relationship as a harm unto itself that should only be
justified if achieved for a proper purpose (such as protecting the interests
287. Silver v. Gold, 259 Cal.Rptr. 185, 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
288. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682. According to the comments, the
elements of the tort of abuse of process are designed to exclude liability when the process
is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite
or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant. Id. cmt. b. “The usual case of abuse of
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of a client) and through the use of proper means (such as bringing a
motion to disqualify in good faith), a tortious interference claim would
advance the same goals of the abuse of process tort while furthering the
important interest in preserving attorney-client relationships.
At the same time, Drummond v. Stahl illustrates the wisdom in not
permitting interference claims to serve as substitutes for other types of tort
claims in some instances. To the extent the interference claim in that case
stemmed from the filing of an ethics complaint, it essentially was serving
as a substitute for a defamation or wrongful initiation claim. Because
probable cause existed for the filing of the complaint, the court reached
the correct result by not permitting the interference claim to proceed.292
To the extent the interference claim stemmed from the motion to
disqualify, it was essentially serving as a substitute for an abuse of process
claim. The court was again justified in barring the interference claim.
Although it was unnecessary to extend the absolute litigation privilege to
the interference claim, the interference claim was defective because the
defendant-attorney’s conduct was not independently tortious. There was
no allegation that the defendant-attorney engaged in the same type of
deception as the defendant in Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas,
Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., nor was there any evidence that the motion lacked
probable cause or was in any way frivolous.293 Therefore, despite the fact
that the defendant-attorney may have acted with the specific intent of
interfering with the plaintiff’s relationship with his client, there was
nothing to indicate that the case involved anything more than an attorney
acting in good faith on behalf of his client.
D. TRIAL TACTICS AS A FORM OF IMPROPER INTERFERENCE

While several of the above decisions stand for the general proposition
that an interference claim may lie against an attorney for conduct
occurring in the course of and related to the litigation process, a 1988
Texas case illustrates the lengths to which some courts will go to shield
attorneys from liability in such cases. In Maynard v. Caballero, 294 a
criminal defense attorney was charged with improperly interfering with
the relationship between a co-defendant and his attorney. According to
the plaintiff (the co-defendant in a prior criminal matter), the defendantattorney convinced the plaintiff’s attorney to limit the cross examination
of a prosecution witness, to the apparent detriment of the plaintiff. 295
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malpractice and the defendant-attorney for tortious interference.296 The
Texas Court of Appeals made quick work of the plaintiff’s interference
claim, stating that the defendant-attorney’s actions were privileged
because the defendant-attorney had a contractual duty to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law. 297 While recognizing the
potential for discord in any case involving the joinder of criminal parties,
the court nonetheless stated that an aggrieved party’s proper recourse was
against the party’s own attorney, lest the public’s interest “in loyal,
faithful and aggressive representation by the legal profession . . . be
severely hampered to the detriment of all.”298
Later Texas cases have built upon the reasoning of Maynard and
similar cases to construct a broad rule that limits attorney liability for
actions taken in the litigation process to only the most egregious
behavior.299 As a general rule, attorneys cannot be held liable for
wrongful litigation conduct under virtually any theory, either to an
opposing party or opposing counsel.300 If, in the course of representing a
client, an attorney engages in unethical conduct that harms another
attorney or an opposing party, the “remedy” is public (in the form of
professional discipline) rather than private.301 The Texas courts have said,
Any other rule would act as a severe and crippling deterrent
to the ends of justice for the reason that a litigant might be
denied a full development of his case if his attorney were
subject to the threat of liability for defending his client’s
position to the best and fullest extent allowed by law, and
availing his client of all rights to which he is entitled.302
The only exception to this general immunity is where an attorney engages
in fraudulent activity that injures a third person, the theory being such
action is “foreign to the duties of an attorney.”303
A closer examination of the Maynard case raises a question as to
whether permitting an interference claim in some limited situations would
truly constitute an improper interference with a lawyer’s ability to practice
law. As the dissenting opinion in Maynard pointed out, the defendantattorney, who convinced the plaintiff’s attorney to limit the cross
296. Id.
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examination of a prosecution witness, allegedly did so, in part, in order to
avert attention from the fact that the defendant-attorney was a suspect in a
related case. 304 Furthermore, the plaintiff had alleged that another
motivation behind the defendant-attorney’s actions was the fact that the
prosecution witness was actually a former client of the defendant-attorney,
and the defendant-attorney feared that rigorous cross examination would
reveal this relationship, thereby necessitating the disqualification of the
defendant-attorney from the case and the surrender of the attorney’s fee.305
In sum, the defendant-attorney was alleged to have interfered in order to
hide his own conflicts of interest so that he could recover his full
attorney’s fee, when the rules of professional responsibility might have
prohibited him from doing so had the truth come to light. Surely, action
that violates some of the cardinal rules of professional responsibility is,
almost by definition, “foreign to the duties of an attorney.” 306 Yet, the
majority opinion dispensed with any argument concerning the defendantattorney’s allegedly self-interested actions, instead stating that the
defendant-attorney’s motives “were not for [the plaintiff] to pass judgment
on.”307
The court’s holding might have been justified had it been limited to
criminal matters. Arguably, the plaintiff brought the interference claim in
an attempt to seek recovery from the defendant when he probably would
have been prohibited from recovering from his own attorney under the
rule that a criminal defendant may not recover on a malpractice theory
unless there is proof of actual innocence. 308 Allowing an interference
claim to lie in such a case would arguably undermine the policy choices
previously made with respect to the rules regarding malpractice in the
criminal setting. However, the court’s holding is not limited to the
criminal context.309 If the facts of Maynard are changed so that an
unhappy civil defendant is bringing the interference claim, the rule
announced by the court is much harder to justify. While the concerns over
recognizing a duty owed to a co-defendant on the part of an attorney might
be justified in the context of a negligence claim, the co-defendant in
Maynard was not unhappy about the fact that his co-defendant’s attorney’s
negligence had caused his own attorney to do a poor job. He was unhappy
about the fact that this attorney had intentionally caused his own attorney
to do a poor job in order to protect the attorney’s own interests, rather than
those of his client. If one views an intentional interference with an
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attorney-client relationship, carried out in such a way so as to potentially
subject an attorney to disbarment, as having adverse consequences not just
for the plaintiff and his or her attorney, but also for society’s interests in
an ethical legal profession and the fair administration of justice, it is
difficult to see why an interference claim should not be recognized.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cases such as those discussed throughout this Article present courts
with difficult policy choices. Recognizing the availability of tortious
interference claims (or any tort claims brought by third parties) for actions
that lie close to the core of what it means to practice law may chill lawyers
in the exercise of their professional duties, thus limiting the effectiveness
of counsel. Furthermore, there is an undeniable logic to the position of the
Maynard court that the remedy of a client who receives inadequate
representation because of the actions of another attorney should lie against
the client’s own attorney, rather than the interfering attorney.310 Finally,
there is also clearly a danger in allowing an interference claim to substitute
f o r a more logical tort action (such as defamation or malicious
prosecution) when the other tort action is barred by existing law. The
danger in such cases is that by permitting interference claims to serve as a
substitute for another, flawed claim, interference claims have the potential
to undermine the policy choices previously made in establishing the
contours of the other cause of action. These are precisely the same types
of arguments that have been advanced in settings not involving attorneys.
Yet, there are ways to limit the potentially expansive sweep of the
interference torts short of prohibiting any type of tort action by a third
party against an attorney or specifically barring tortious interference
claims. If courts are willing to move beyond the “one size fits all”
approach that currently dominates much of interference case law and
construct context-specific rules defining what constitutes an intentional
and improper interference in the case of misconduct on the part of an
attorney during the litigation process, the goals of tort law and the legal
profession can be adequately balanced.
Redefining the intent and improper interference elements as described
would almost certainly limit the number of interference claims in the
specific context of a defendant-attorney engaged in the practice of law,311
while still preserving the ability of plaintiffs to pursue such actions in truly
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in cases such as Mantia v. Hanson, where the defendant does not actually
desire to interfere with the plaintiff’s relations with other parties.
However, it would preserve the ability of plaintiffs to pursue such a claim
where the defendant has intentionally used the litigation process as a tool
to drive a wedge between the plaintiff and a contracting partner and used
improper means to do so, as was alleged in Safeway Insurance Co. v.
Guerrero. Additionally, it would preserve a plaintiff’s ability to pursue
claims where the defendant has acted with the desire to limit the
effectiveness of the plaintiff’s contracting partner while violating the rules
of professional responsibility, as was alleged in Maynard v. Caballero.
In so doing, the interference torts could serve as an important tool in
compensating legitimate injuries while deterring the type of misconduct
that endangers the legal profession as a whole.

